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Easing the Tension Between Statutes of 
Limitations and the Continuing Offense Doctrine 
Jeffrey R. Boles* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article is the first to analyze comprehensively the relationship between the 
continuing offense doctrine and criminal statutes of limitations. The continuing offense 
doctrine is a powerful tool for prosecutors who face statute of limitations challenges. It 
functions to delay the running of statutes of limitations for certain crimes by postponing 
the completion of those crimes. In order to trigger the operation of the doctrine, a court 
must conclude that a particular crime is a “continuing offense” for statute of limitations 
purposes. Identifying what crimes are continuing offenses has been a problematic 
exercise for federal courts, leading to a growing number of conflicting approaches and 
circuit splits. Moreover, courts are employing the continuing offense doctrine with 
increasing frequency, subjecting otherwise time-barred conduct to prosecution and 
boosting the risk of violation of the rights of the defendant, such as prosecution based 
upon stale evidence. This Article examines the shortcomings of the continuing offense 
doctrine and its potential for misuse in the statute of limitations context, and provides 
solutions to reform the doctrine and restore order in what has become a chaotic area of 
jurisprudence. 
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Imagine that the local United States Attorney’s Office charges a defendant investor 
with one count of securities fraud for allegedly executing fraudulent trades as part of a 
securities fraud scheme. Imagine also that the defendant argues, in a motion to dismiss, 
that the statute of limitations prohibits prosecution because the defendant’s alleged 
conduct occurred more than five years prior to the indictment. The government counters 
that securities fraud is a “continuing offense” for statute of limitations purposes, placing 
the defendant’s entire course of fraudulent conduct within the statute of limitations and 
subject to prosecution. Resolving this dispute depends upon whether the court will deem 
securities fraud to be a continuing offense, which would expand the limitations period in 
this instance. For this reason, deciding whether a particular offense is continuing for 
statute of limitations purposes, a seemingly benign issue, is generating robust controversy 
and conflicting approaches across the federal courts. 
Criminal statutes of limitations serve a number of purposes in the public interest. 
For instance, they restrict a defendant’s exposure to prosecution to a finite period of time, 
bestowing amnesty from prosecution once the limitations period has ended.1 They also 
encourage law enforcement officials to investigate suspected criminal activity promptly.2 
                                                
1 Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 113–14 (1970), overruled by 50 U.S.C. App. § 463 on other 
grounds as stated by, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 890 F.2d 1088, 1091–92 (10th Cir. 1989). 
2 Id. at 115. 
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Legislatures create and modify limitations statutes in order to balance the government’s 
need for adequate time to uncover, investigate, and prosecute crime against the 
defendant’s interest in avoiding the threat of prosecution for stale crimes committed long 
ago.3  
As a general rule, limitations periods commence at the moment when each element 
of a crime has occurred.4 The Supreme Court created an exception to the general 
limitations rule by carving out the continuing offense doctrine. The doctrine provides that 
the statute of limitations for continuing offenses begins to run not when the elements of 
the offense are first met, but when the offense terminates.5 Although seemingly 
straightforward in its operation, the continuing offense doctrine can have a powerful 
impact on a defendant’s conviction because it ushers in conduct that predates the stated 
limitations period, provided that part of the defendant’s alleged course of conduct occurs 
within the stated limitations period. Not surprisingly, the government frequently tries to 
categorize offenses as continuing to avoid the running of the statute of limitations.6 
The Supreme Court has recognized the inherent tension between the continuing 
offense doctrine and statutes of limitations and has directed that the continuing offense 
doctrine be applied sparingly.7 The instruction is in deference to the policy concerns 
underlying statutes of limitations, which are designed to protect defendants from possible 
prejudice occasioned by impaired memories, lost evidence, and absent witnesses.8 To 
facilitate the process, the Supreme Court issued a test in its seminal decision United 
States v. Toussie9 for courts to determine whether a criminal offense is continuing for 
statute of limitations purposes. The Court’s test has significantly enhanced the analysis, 
but major issues remain. 
Applying the continuing offense doctrine has proven to be a challenging exercise 
for the federal courts; they have applied the doctrine unevenly, often struggling with the 
decision of whether a particular crime is a continuing offense. Most crimes transpire 
instantaneously and discretely, but continuing offenses span a period of time in their 
commission and cause recurring harm in the process.10 Many federal offenses can be 
categorized as either discrete or continuing without difficulty, presenting virtually no 
conceptual issues. There is, however, an array of crimes that have posed difficulties to the 
courts in this regard.  
                                                
3 United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322 (1971); United States v. DiSantillo, 615 F.2d 128, 135 (3d 
Cir. 1980). 
4 Toussie, 397 U.S. at 115; United States v. Yashar, 166 F.3d 873, 875 (7th Cir. 1999).  
5 Toussie, 397 U.S. at 115. The continuing offense doctrine is occasionally referred to as the continuing 
crime doctrine. See, e.g., United States v. Fleetwood, 489 F. Supp. 129, 131 (D. Or. 1980) (using the term 
“continuing crime doctrine”). This criminal law doctrine is separate and unrelated to the continuing 
violations doctrine from the civil law. See James R. MacAyeal, Discovery Rule and the Continuing 
Violation Doctrine as Exceptions to the Statute of Limitations for Civil Environmental Penalty Claims, 15 
VA. ENVTL. L.J. 589, 622–23 (1996). 
6 See State v. Gainer, 227 Kan. 670, 672 (1980) (“The continuing offense doctrine is usually advanced by 
the prosecution to avoid the running of the statute of limitations.”). 
7 Toussie, 397 U.S. at 115. 
8 Id. at 115. 
9 See id. at 115. 
10 See Note, Statute of Limitations in Criminal Law: A Penetrable Barrier to Prosecution, 102 U. PA. L. 
REV. 630, 641–42 (1954) [hereinafter Penetrable Barrier to Prosecution].  
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First, Courts have applied the Toussie test inconsistently and have issued clashing 
statutory interpretations and conflicting decisions across a number of jurisdictions. 
Confusing and muddled case law, including a handful of circuit splits, has emerged as a 
result. Second, amidst this confusion lies a troubling pattern: a growing number of courts 
have applied the continuing offense doctrine loosely, in essence ignoring that the doctrine 
is disfavored by the Supreme Court and should be applied only in rare circumstances. 
The liberal use of the continuing offense doctrine reflected in these decisions has created 
further disorder, as it fundamentally circumvents the protections to defendants afforded 
by the statutes of limitations. The trend can be viewed as part of a larger shift in the 
criminal law toward retributivism, a theory of criminal justice which espouses the belief 
that proportionate punishment is a justified response to criminal behavior.11 
The continuing offense doctrine has been virtually unexplored by legal 
scholarship.12 The thorny conceptual issues and problematic applications it generates in 
the realm of statutes of limitations are ripe for examination and reform. This Article 
scrutinizes the inherent conflict between statutes of limitations and the continuing offense 
doctrine, explores the conceptual landscape and the disruptive uses of the continuing 
offense doctrine, and offers legislative and judicial solutions to rehabilitate the doctrine.13 
Part I of the Article provides an overview of the nature and purposes of criminal statutes 
of limitations. Part II examines the continuing offense doctrine, its relationship to statutes 
of limitations, and the process by which courts determine whether an offense is 
continuing. Part III analyzes the federal courts’ treatment of the continuing offense 
doctrine and inspects the doctrine’s overuse and the circuit splits it has generated. Part IV 
concludes with recommendations for reforming the continuing offense doctrine and 
restoring order in this problematic area of jurisprudence.  
I. CRIMINAL STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS 
A. Nature and Effects 
A criminal statute of limitations establishes “a time limit for prosecuting a crime, 
based on the date when the offense occurred.”14 It bars the government from prosecuting 
an offense if the government fails to file an indictment or other formal charge within the 
limitations period.15 Without such statutes, the government could initiate a prosecution 
indefinitely.16  
Statutes of limitations are entirely “creatures of statute,” existing only to the extent 
                                                
11 See Mark D. White, RETRIBUTIVISM xi (2011). 
12 Continuing offenses have been addressed in legal scholarship, but their connection to statutes of 
limitations has not been substantively examined. See, e.g., J. Richard Broughton, On Straddle Crimes and 
the Ex Post Facto Clauses, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 719, 724 (2011) (discussing the relationship between 
continuing offenses and ex post facto prohibitions). 
13 This Article analyzes federal, rather than state, law approaches to criminal statutes of limitations and the 
continuing offense doctrine due to active developments of the continuing offense doctrine within the 
federal law. However, it may serve as a foundation for evaluation of various state law approaches to these 
areas of inquiry. 
14 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1546 (9th ed. 2009). 
15 See, e.g., Toussie, 397 U.S. at 113–14.  
16 21 AM. JUR. 2D CRIMINAL LAW § 247 (2008). 
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that they are created by legislatures,17 as no criminal limitations period existed at 
common law.18 As summarized by the California Supreme Court, “statutes of limitation 
are an optional form of legislative grace.”19 Legislatures may enact, modify or repeal 
them at will.20  
The federal government,21 and nearly all state legislatures,22 have enacted criminal 
statutes of limitations. In the federal sphere, § 3282(a) of Title 18 of the United States 
Code establishes a default five-year limitations period that extends to most federal 
crimes.23 Moreover, Congress has chosen special limitations periods for a variety of 
crimes,24 enacting statutes that generally relate the length of the limitations period to the 
seriousness of the crime.25 Indeed, Congress has established that no limitations periods 
apply to capital and certain other offenses; these offenses may be prosecuted at any 
time.26  
B. Purposes 
Courts27 and commentators28 have recognized that criminal statutes of limitations 
are equitable in nature and serve a number of purposes in the public interest. At the 
                                                
17 51 AM. JUR. 2D LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS § 1 (2000).  
18 See, e.g., Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 169 (1987) (Scalia, J., 
concurring); Gilliam v. Admiral Corp., 268 A.2d 338, 340 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1970) (noting that 
“[u]nder the common law no time was fixed for the bringing of an action”). 
19 People v. Frazer, 982 P.2d 180 (Cal. 1999), rev’d on other grounds, Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 
633 (2003). 
20 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Duffy, 96 Pa. 506 (1881); 51 AM. JUR. 2D LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS § 35 
(1970). In Duffy, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that “an act of limitation is an act of grace purely 
on the part of the legislature. . . . Such enactments are measures of public policy only[,] . . . entirely subject 
to the mere will of the legislative power and may be changed or repealed altogether, as that power may see 
fit to declare.” Duffy, 96 Pa. at 511. 
21 Congress has enacted a general statute of limitations, 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a), that establishes a five-year 
limitations period for most federal crimes. For a discussion of the history and predecessors of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3282, see Alan L. Adlestein, Conflict of the Criminal Statute of Limitations with Lesser Offenses at Trial, 
37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 199, 249 n.222 (1995).  
22 Nearly every state, with the exceptions of South Carolina and Wyoming, has a criminal statute of 
limitations. See id. at 250 n.223 (highlighting states’ limitations periods).  
23 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) (2006) provides, “Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, no person shall be 
prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offense, not capital, unless the indictment is found or the information 
is instituted within five years next after such offense shall have been committed.” 
24 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3294 (2006) (providing a twenty-year limitations period for the theft of art work); 
18 U.S.C. § 3291 (2006) (providing a ten-year limitations period for certain nationality, citizenship, 
passport, and visa offenses). 
25 Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 668 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“In general, the graver the 
offense, the longer the limitations period; indeed, many serious offenses, such as murder, typically carry no 
limitations period at all.”). 
26 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3281 (2006) (“An indictment for any offense punishable by death may be found at 
any time without limitation.”); 18 U.S.C. § 3299 (2006) (no limitations periods apply to federal child 
abduction and sex offenses). 
27 See, e.g., United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (“We should regard the plea of limitations 
as a meritorious defense, in itself serving a public interest.”).  
28 See, e.g., Penetrable Barrier to Prosecution, supra note 10, at 632 (“Criminal statutes of limitations 
ostensibly serve several purposes, all of which relate to the efficacy of criminal law administration.”).  
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epicenter is a balancing process that underlies the creation and maintenance of criminal 
statutes of limitations, which “represent legislative assessments of relative interests of the 
State and the defendant in administering justice.”29 Most legal scholars contend that the 
statutes are designed to balance the competing interests of the government to discover, 
investigate, and prosecute crime against two primary countervailing factors: protecting 
the defendant and enhancing efficiency.30 The Supreme Court has referenced these 
factors in perhaps the most heavily cited summary of the purposes of criminal statutes of 
limitations: 
The purpose of a statute of limitations is to limit exposure to criminal 
prosecution to a certain fixed period of time following the occurrence of 
those acts the legislature has decided to punish by criminal sanctions. Such 
a limitation is designed to protect individuals from having to defend 
themselves against charges when the basic facts may have become 
obscured by the passage of time and to minimize the danger of official 
punishment because of acts in the far-distant past. Such a time limit may 
also have the salutary effect of encouraging law enforcement officials 
promptly to investigate suspected criminal activity.31 
1. Safeguarding the Defendant’s Rights 
Perhaps the most important policy effectuated by criminal statutes of limitations is 
the protection of defendants. Courts have emphasized that criminal statutes of limitations 
“exist[] primarily to protect the rights of the defendant.”32 The statutes grant amnesty 
from prosecution, after the limitations period has expired, by providing an irrebuttable 
presumption that a defendant’s right to a fair trial would be prejudiced.33 Underlying the 
statutes’ policy to safeguard defendants are the overarching rationales of repose and 
protection from prejudice stemming from stale claims.  
i. Providing Repose 
Courts strongly endorse the value of repose, an instrumental policy expressed in 
                                                
29 United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322 (1971). 
30 See, e.g., United States v. Marshall, 856 F.2d 896, 899–900 (7th Cir. 1988); Yair Listokin, Efficient Time 
Bars? A New Rationale for the Existence of Statutes of Limitations in Criminal Law, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 99 
(2002); Suzette M. Malveaux, Statutes of Limitations: A Policy Analysis in the Context of Reparations 
Litigation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68, 75 (2005); Lindsay Powell, Unraveling Criminal Statutes of 
Limitations, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 115, 128–29 (2008). 
31 Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 114–15 (1970). 
32 United States v. Podde, 105 F.3d 813, 819 (2d Cir. 1997); see also United States v. Levine, 658 F.2d 113, 
119 (3d Cir. 1981) (“Fairness to defendants would appear to be the primary consideration of statutes of 
limitations.”). Criminal statutes of limitations do not fully define a defendant’s rights with respect to the 
events occurring prior to indictment. Marion, 404 U.S. at 324. Pre-indictment delay may violate the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, but only when the delay “caused substantial prejudice to the 
defendant’s rights to a fair trial and that the delay was an intentional device to gain tactical advantage over 
the accused.” Id.  
33 Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 611 (2003); Marion, 404 U.S. at 322. 
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criminal statutes of limitations.34 “[C]riminal statutes of limitation are to be liberally 
interpreted in favor of repose.”35 Scholars have noted that while oft-cited in relevant legal 
opinions, the term “repose” is rarely explored.36 In the context of limitations statutes, 
repose includes the interrelated concepts of affording peace of mind, avoiding the 
disruption of settled expectations, and reducing uncertainty about the future in the lives of 
defendants.37  
Repose plays a central policy role within limitations statutes because its converse 
tenet, subjecting a person indefinitely to the threat of potential criminal punishment, can 
offend one’s sense of justice.38 When operating through statutes of limitations, repose 
functions as a salve to someone’s anxiety and fear of potential prosecution for offenses 
from the distant past.39  
By bringing repose, statutes of limitations function as an insurance-mechanism, 
providing notice that one cannot be prosecuted once the pertinent time period has passed. 
Grounded in concepts of due process, notice is critical for one’s defense, as it brings 
knowledge of an accusation and the impetus to discover facts for defense, preserve 
evidence, and prepare for trial.40  
ii. Barring Stale Claims 
Evidence deteriorates over time, and criminal statutes of limitations aim to prevent 
the unfair use of stale evidence to convict a defendant. The statutes “are the primary 
guarantee a citizen possesses against stale or long-delayed charges being made against 
him.”41 “Stale claims” may encompass the possibilities that: (a) evidence has 
deteriorated; (b) dominant legal and cultural norms have shifted since the underlying 
events transpired; (c) the accused has changed their stance and would be prejudiced by 
defending the prosecution; and (d) an excessively long duration of time has transpired 
between the underlying events and the filing of the indictment.42 As the Supreme Court 
has elaborated, the statutes “protect defendants and the courts from having to deal with 
cases in which the search for truth may be seriously impaired by the loss of evidence, 
whether by death or disappearance of witnesses, fading memories, disappearance of 
                                                
34 Levine, 658 F.2d at 125 (“[S]tatutes of limitations embody historically important rights of repose and 
fairness for defendants which are fundamental to our system of criminal law. . . .”); Bridges v. United 
States, 346 U.S. 209, 215–16 (1953) (the “long-standing congressional ‘policy of repose’ . . . is 
fundamental to our society and our criminal law”); United States v. Prosperi, 573 F. Supp. 2d 436, 444 n.15 
(D. Mass. 2008) (“Statutes of limitations are favored by the law and courts are to interpret them in favor of 
a finding of repose because of the salutary effect on the just enforcement of the criminal laws.”). 
35 United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322 (1971). 
36 See Tyler T. Ochoa & Andrew J. Wistrich, The Puzzling Purposes of Statutes of Limitation, 28 PAC. L.J. 
453, 460 (1997). 
37 Id. 
38 United States v. Frequency Elecs., 862 F. Supp. 834, 843 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (“Vital to our sense of justice 
is the notion that we may not subject someone indefinitely to the threat of potential criminal punishment.”). 
39 United States v. DiSantillo, 615 F.2d 128, 135 (3d Cir. 1980). 
40 Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201 (1948); United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 677 F. Supp. 1042, 
1045 (C.D. Cal. 1998), rev'd on other grounds, 877 F.2d 734 (9th Cir. 1989). 
41 United States v. Birney, 686 F.2d 102, 105 (2d Cir. 1982). 
42 Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 36, at 458. 
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documents, or otherwise.”43  
2. Promoting Efficiency 
Society benefits from the limitations statutes’ focus on recently committed 
crimes.44 The statutes “provide an incentive for action on behalf of the government in 
criminal cases that is swift, sure, and certain.”45 They prod law enforcement to investigate 
suspected criminal activity and prosecutors to charge offenders promptly.46 Prosecutors 
face a greater possibility of successful convictions with increased ability to prove their 
cases, offenders are brought to justice more quickly, and courts are relieved of the burden 
of adjudicating long-abandoned or tenuous crimes.47 Moreover, the limitations statutes’ 
focus on fresh evidence helps protect society from convicting its citizens erroneously 
based upon unreliable evidence, thus garnering the public’s respect in the judiciary.48  
Limitations law also promotes judicial efficiency. It reduces transaction costs 
associated with gathering evidence to reconstruct the distant past, reduces the number of 
indictments filed, and simplifies judicial decisions by drawing a predictable bright-line 
rule.49 One scholar has likened limitations statutes to gatekeepers in that they allow 
timely claims and bar untimely ones, creating clarity and saving time and resources in the 
process.50 
C. Policies Opposing Criminal Statutes of Limitations 
The legal community has recognized that criminal statutes of limitations also bring 
considerable costs along with the benefits they bestow. The mechanical operation of 
statute of limitations does not take into consideration whether newly available evidence 
overwhelmingly establishes a defendant’s guilt. Rather, these statutes block the 
prosecution of offenses which may be in society’s best interest to punish, essentially 
providing amnesty to offenders after the limitations period has expired. With their all-or-
nothing approach, the statutes “paint with a broad brush of an inflexible general rule” and 
allow no room for judicial evaluation of the particular offense or offender.51 The Supreme 
Court acknowledged this reality by noting that “every statute of limitations . . . may 
permit a rogue to escape.”52 
In addition, critical commentators have highlighted the arbitrary features of 
                                                
43 United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979).  
44 United States v. Levine, 658 F.2d 113, 119 n.4 (3d Cir. 1981).  
45 State v. Ricci, No. 01C01-9403, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 34, at *14 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 12, 
1995). 
46 Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 115 (1970); United States v. Otto, 742 F.2d 104, 107 (3d Cir. 
1984).  
47 Otto, 742 F.2d at 107; see also United States v. Eliopoulos, 45 F. Supp. 777, 781 (D.N.J. 1942) (“Statutes 
of limitation are founded upon the liberal theory that prosecutions should not be allowed to ferment 
endlessly in the files of the government to explode only after witnesses and proofs necessary to the 
protection of the accused have by sheer lapse of time passed beyond availability.”). 
48 See Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 36, at 481–82. 
49 Malveaux, supra note 30, at 78–80. 
50 Id. at 81. 
51 Adlestein, supra note 21, at 266. 
52 Toussie, 397 U.S. at 123–24 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
Vol. 7:2] Jeffrey R. Boles 
 227 
limitations statutes.53 One may find the selection of the duration of limitations periods 
particularly difficult to justify. Originally enacted in 1790, the federal default criminal 
limitations period has shifted over time from two, to three, to five years, with scant 
legislative history justifying these changes.54 It is unclear whether the five-year 
limitations period is optimal or whether a single limitations period is even appropriate for 
most federal crimes.55 Given these criticisms, some have called for the abolishment of the 
current limitations laws and replacement with a standard-based approach that evaluates 
any time-based prejudice to defendants on a case-by-case basis.56 
D. Construction by the Courts 
Despite criticisms from the legal community, the judiciary and legislatures remain 
strongly committed to upholding the protections afforded by criminal statutes of 
limitations. Congress has proclaimed a policy that the statute of limitations should not be 
extended “(e)xcept as otherwise expressly provided by law.”57 The Supreme Court 
supplemented the congressional mandate by instructing that criminal statutes of 
limitations are to be strictly construed in favor of the accused.58 Many scholars agree with 
this construction and maintain that criminal statutes of limitations are, at their core, 
protective statutes that serve the public interest, despite their shortcomings.59 Because 
“the statutes are fixed by the legislature and not decreed by courts on an ad hoc basis,” 
their existence provides predictability to defendants and society; as a result, members of 
society may rely on the statutes to their benefit.60 
II. CONTINUING OFFENSES 
A. Defining a Continuing Offense 
Within the criminal law, crimes may be classified according to their nature61 as 
instantaneous or continuing. As its name implies, an instantaneous offense is a “discrete 
act”62 that occurs at a single, immediate period of time. The harm which it causes occurs 
                                                
53 See Powell, supra note 30, at 117 (examining the fundamental arbitrariness of limitations periods). 
54 Act of Apr.  30,  1790,  ch.9,  I Stat.  112,  119 repealed by The Diplomatic  Relations  Act  of  1978,  §§  
1–6,  22  U.S.C.  §§  254a–254e; Act of Apr. 13, 1876, ch. 56, 19 Stat. 32, 32–33; Act of Sept. 1, 1954, ch. 
1214, § 10(a), 68 Stat. 1142, 1145, amended by Act of Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-299, 75 Stat. 640, 
648. 
55 See Powell, supra note 30, at 117. 
56 See id. at 154. 
57 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a); see also Toussie, 397 U.S. at 115. 
58 See, e.g., United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322 n.14 (1971); United States v. Morgan, 922 F.2d 
1495, 1500 (10th Cir. 1991). 
59 See, e.g., Listokin, supra note 30, at 114; Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 36, at 512–13. 
60 Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 665–66 (1992).  
61 Courts often use the term “nature” when analyzing crimes in the continuing offense context. See, e.g., 
infra note 66 and accompanying text. It generally refers to a crime’s elements. For a discussion of the 
inherent vagueness in the term “nature” in the continuing offense context, see supra subpart III.B For a 
proposed definition of a crime’s “nature” involving its statutorily defined legal elements, see supra subpart 
IV.A 
62 United States v. Bucheit, 134 F. App’x 842, 853 (6th Cir. 2005). 
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in that moment and does not continue beyond it. An example is battery.63 A battery 
transpires, for instance, at the moment when a perpetrator’s closed fist makes contact 
with a victim’s body. The crime and its attendant harm cease when the perpetrator 
removes his fist from the victim’s body.  
On the other hand, the term “continuing offense” is a term of art which embodies a 
special legal meaning. It is a course of conduct spanning an extended period of time,64 
and the harm it generates continues uninterrupted until the course of conduct ceases. As 
Judge O’Scannlain has summarized, the continuing offense generally “involves (1) an 
ongoing course of conduct that causes (2) a harm[65] that lasts as long as that course of 
conduct persists.”66 The continuing offense is “one which by its nature or by its terms is a 
single, ongoing crime.”67 A defendant participating in all or any part of a continuing 
offense may be charged with only one crime.68 
There is a legal distinction between conduct that the legislature and judiciary 
declare as a “continuing offense” and conduct that constitutes an ongoing course of 
criminal activity but is not deemed a “continuing offense.”69 Courts have recognized that 
a “continuing offense” is a term of art that “does not merely mean an offense that 
continues in a factual sense, as where a defendant engages in a course of conduct 
comprised of repeated criminal violations, such as recurring sales of narcotics or a string 
of separate robberies.”70 The Supreme Court has described the term as a continuous, 
                                                
63 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 784.03(1)(a)(1) (2001) (defining the offense of battery as “occur[ring] when a 
person actually and intentionally touches or strikes another person against the will of the other”). 
64 Bucheit, 134 F. App’x at 853; United States v. McGoff, 831 F.3d 1071, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“A 
continuous offense . . . is an unlawful course of conduct that does perdure.”); Penetrable Barrier to 
Prosecution, supra note 10, at 641; see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1186 (9th ed. 2009) (“A crime 
(such as a conspiracy) that is committed over a period of time . . . .”). Hence, discrete criminal acts are 
considered to be categorically separate from continuing offenses. See United States v. De La Mata, 266 
F.3d 1275, 1288 (11th Cir. 2001) (“A continuing offense is one which is not complete upon the first act, but 
instead continues to be perpetrated over time.”). Continuing offenses are also known as continuous crimes. 
See, e.g., United States v. Mardirosian, 602 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2010) (“The possession and concealment of 
stolen property is a continuous crime.”). 
65 Courts have used the term “harm” in the continuing offense doctrine context to describe “the substantive 
evil [to society that] Congress sought to prevent” in making certain actions or omissions federal crimes. 
Toussie, 397 U.S. at 122 (“It is in the nature of a conspiracy that each day's acts bring a renewed threat of 
the substantive evil Congress sought to prevent.”); see also United States v. Morales, 11 F.3d 915, 922 (9th 
Cir. 1993) (“The harm done [by bribery] is intangible, but real enough: the undermining of public 
confidence, the loss of respect for and pride in our institutions. Congress simply has chosen to address this 
last kind of ‘substantive evil’ in section 201(b)(2).”); United States v. Cunningham, 891 F. Supp. 460, 464 
(N.D. Ill. 1995) (“A prime example [of a continuing offense] is kidnapping, where the offender continues 
to violate the law and harm the victim every day that the victim is not released.”). 
66 Morales, 11 F.3d at 921 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting). Judge O’Scannlain elaborates that “the 
commission of [continuing offenses] takes place not in a moment, but over a span of time . . . [and the] 
harm done to society through [the] commission necessarily continues on for as long as the crime is 
ongoing.” Id. 
67 United States v. Castellano, 610 F. Supp. 1359, 1408 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).  
68 Castellano, 610 F. Supp. at 1408. 
69 United States v. Rivlin, No. 07-Cr-524, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89323, at *6–7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2007). 
70 Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also United States v. Yashar, 166 F.3d 873, 875 
(7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Reitmeyer, 356 F.3d 1313, 1321 (10th Cir. 2004) (“The term ‘continuing 
offense’ is a term of art that does not depend on everyday notions or ordinary meaning.”). 
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unlawful act or series of acts “set on foot by a single impulse and operated by an 
unintermittent force, however long a time it may occupy.”71 Conceptually, as the 
perpetrator engages in the continuing offense, a crime continues to be committed each 
moment. “The hallmark of the continuing offense is that it perdures beyond the initial 
illegal act, and that ‘each day brings a renewed threat of the evil Congress sought to 
prevent even after the elements necessary to establish the crime have occurred.’”72 These 
offenses continue until the proscribed course of conduct ceases, as “continuing offenses 
do not, in general, continue indefinitely.”73  
A prototypical example of a continuing offense is the possession of contraband.74 
The offense begins when the perpetrator acquires the contraband item and continues 
every day, until the perpetrator parts with the item. The crime qualifies as a continuing 
offense because the ongoing course of conduct, possession of the item, causes harm every 
moment that the perpetrator possesses the item.75 
B. Applying the Statute of Limitations to Continuing Offenses: An Overview 
Whether a crime is continuous or not affects the operation of the statute of 
limitations. Ordinarily, the limitations period commences when a crime is committed and 
“complete,”76 regardless of whether the government has discovered the existence of the 
crime.77 As a general rule, a crime is “complete” as soon as every element of the crime 
has occurred.78  
An exception from the general rule is the continuing offense, which is not deemed 
complete until the perpetrator’s entire course of conduct ceases.79 For continuing 
offenses, the last act of the offense controls when the statute of limitations commences.80 
Accordingly, the statute does not begin to run when all of the elements of the continuing 
offense are initially present, rather when the entire course of conduct ceases.81 For all 
practical purposes, courts look to the last day of the continuing offense to determine 
when the statute of limitations commenced. For instance, a court will look to the last day 
on which a perpetrator possessed an illegal firearm to determine when the statute of 
limitations began to run for a firearms possession offense.82 In effect, the continuing 
                                                
71 United States v. Midstate Horticultural Co., 306 U.S. 161, 166 (1939) (citation omitted). 
72 Yashar, 166 F.3d at 875 (quoting Toussie, 397 U.S. at 122); see also State v. Legg, 9 S.W.3d 111, 116 
n.3 (Tenn. 1999) (“[E]very moment an offense is continued, the offense is committed anew.”). 
73 United States v. McGoff, 831 F.3d 1071, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1987).  
74 See supra subpart II.E for a discussion of possessory crimes and additional examples of continuing 
offenses. 
75 See, e.g., United States v. Zrallack, No. 3:10CR68, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65988, at *6 (D. Conn. July 2, 
2010) (“Grenades are inherently dangerous weapons for which no peaceful purpose can be seriously 
suggested, regardless of whether [they] are actually used. As [grenade possession] is a continuing offense, 
the risk of harm remained present throughout its alleged commission.”). 
76 Pendergast v. United States, 317 U.S. 412, 418 (1943). 
77 See, e.g., United States v. Mubayyid, 567 F. Supp. 2d 223, 239 (D. Mass. 2008). 
78 United States v. Smith, 740 F.2d 734, 736 (9th Cir. 1984); accord Yashar, 166 F.3d at 875; United States 
v. Payne, 978 F.2d 1177, 1179 (10th Cir. 1992). 
79 United States v. Motz, 652 F. Supp. 2d 284, 293 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). 
80 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1186 (9th ed. 2009). 
81 Nisenzon v. Morgan Stanley DW, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4078, at *12 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2007). 
82 See, e.g., United States v. Krstic, 558 F.3d 1010, 1017 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he statute of limitations does 
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offense doctrine extends the statute of limitations beyond its stated term,83 allowing the 
government to prosecute conduct that precedes the stated limitations period. 
C. Brief History of the Continuing Offense Doctrine 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s Toussie decision issued in 1970, no test existed to 
identify a continuing offense in a systematized way; courts generally classified crimes as 
continuing on an unstructured basis with minimal guiding principles.84 Moreover, an 
analysis of federal case law prior to 1970 reveals that courts commonly agreed only that 
conspiracy,85 concealment of bankruptcy assets,86 and failure to register for the draft87 
were continuing offenses for statute of limitations purposes. Courts reached these 
conclusions based upon loose analyses of whether the offenses featured a pattern of 
antisocial behavior.88 While the issue has surfaced in federal and state cases for over a 
century, explorations of this area of the law are virtually absent in the scholarly literature.  
D. The Supreme Court’s Guidance in Toussie v. United States 
Substantive analysis of the relationship between the continuing offense doctrine 
and the statute of limitations must begin with the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in 
Toussie v. United States. Toussie remains the seminal case on defining the nature and 
scope of the continuing offense doctrine.89 In Toussie, the Court crafted the contours of 
the doctrine and propounded a test to determine when an offense should be considered 
continuing for statute of limitations purposes.90  
The defendant in Toussie was required to register for the draft within five days of 
his eighteenth birthday—in accordance with a presidential proclamation issued pursuant 
to § 3 of the Universal Military Training and Service Act91—but he did not register at any 
time.92 He was subsequently convicted and he moved to dismiss based on statute of 
limitations grounds. Upon reviewing the defendant’s conviction, the Court had to 
determine when the statute of limitations began to run for the crime of failure to 
                                                                                                                                            
not begin to run until the possessor parts with the item.”). 
83 Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 115 (1970). 
84 See, e.g., United States v. Mendoza, 122 F. Supp. 367, 368 (N.D. Cal. 1954). 
85 United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 610 (1910); United States v. Graham, 102 F.2d 436, 444 (2d Cir. 
1939). 
86 Somberg v. United States, 71 F.2d 637, 639 (7th Cir. 1934); United States v. Arge, 418 F.2d 721, 724 
(10th Cir. 1969). 
87 Fogel v. United States, 162 F.2d 54, 55 (5th Cir. 1947); McGregor v. United States, 206 F.2d 583, 584 
(4th Cir. 1953). 
88 See Penetrable Barrier to Prosecution, supra note 10, at 641–44. 
89 United States v. Winnie, 97 F.3d 975, 976 (7th Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Bell, 598 F.3d 366, 
369 (7th Cir. 2010) (applying test as set forth in Toussie). 
90 Toussie, 397 U.S. at 114–15. 
91 Section 3 of the Universal Military Training and Service Act, 50 U.S.C. App. § 453 (2006), provides: 
Except as otherwise provided in this title, it shall be the duty of every male citizen . . . 
who, on the day or days fixed for the first or any subsequent registration, is between the 
ages of eighteen and twenty-six, to present himself for and submit to registration at 
such time or times and place or places, and in such manner, as shall be determined by 
proclamation of the President and by rules and regulations prescribed hereunder. 
92 Toussie, 397 U.S. at 113. 
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register.93 The defendant argued that the offense was complete when he failed to register 
in 1959 and that the applicable five-year statute of limitations barred his prosecution 
upon his indictment in 1967.94 The government countered that the crime continued to be 
committed every day that the defendant did not register.95  
The Court began its analysis by warning that the continuing offense doctrine should 
only be applied in “limited circumstances” because the doctrine could contradict the 
purposes of statutes of limitations.96 Noting that “questions of limitations are 
fundamentally matters of legislative . . . decision,” the Court highlighted the “tension 
between the purpose of a statute of limitations and the continuing offense doctrine . . . ; 
the latter, for all practical purposes, extends the statute beyond its stated term.”97 It issued 
a two-part test to determine whether an offense is continuing for statute of limitations 
purposes, holding that an offense should be deemed continuing only if (a) “the explicit 
language of the substantive criminal statute compels such a conclusion,” or (b) “the 
nature of the crime involved is such that Congress must assuredly have intended that it be 
treated as a continuing one.”98 
Applying the test, the Court held that neither the explicit language of the draft 
registration statute nor the nature of the crime involved demonstrated any congressional 
intent for the offense to be treated as continuing for limitations purposes.99 The Court 
therefore concluded that the statute of limitations began to run five days after the 
defendant’s eighteenth birthday in 1959 and reversed his conviction.100 
1. The Toussie Test’s First Prong: Explicit Language of the Statute 
To qualify as a continuing offense under Toussie’s first prong, the explicit language 
of the statute must plainly state that the offense is a continuing one or indicate that the 
statute of limitations begins to run when the entire course of conduct ceases.101 The first 
prong recognizes that Congress knows how to create a continuing offense and has done 
so with blunt language in a number of statutes.102 For instance, 22 U.S.C. § 618(e) 
                                                
93 Id. at 114. 
94 Id.  
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 115. 
97 Toussie, 397 U.S. at 115 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In discussing the application of 
the continuing offense doctrine, the Court stressed the importance of the policy considerations embodied in 
statutes of limitations that protect defendants and that are discussed in Part I. 
98 Toussie, 397 U.S. at 115. The Toussie test is essentially a matter of statutory interpretation; courts must 
ascertain congressional intent when applying it. See United States v. Richardson, 512 F.2d 105, 106 (3d 
Cir. 1975) (“The question is one of ascertaining congressional intent.”). 
99 Toussie, 397 U.S. at 120–22. The Court reasoned that, because draft registration are “instantaneous 
events and not a continuous process, . . . there is nothing inherent in the nature of failing to register that 
makes it a continuing offense.”). Id. at 122.  
100 Id. at 119. 
101 See United States v. Banks, 708 F. Supp. 2d 622, 623 (E.D. Ky. 2010) (“To qualify as a continuing 
offense based on the explicit language of the statute (the first prong of the Toussie test), the statute must 
state the offense is a ‘continuing offense’ or indicate when the statute of limitations begins to run.”). 
102 As “continuing offense” is a settled term of art, see United States v. Reitmeyer, 356 F.3d 1313, 1321 
(10th Cir. 2004), courts must presume that Congress has accorded “continuing offense” its traditional legal 
meaning, rather than an ordinary meaning, when Congress utilizes the term in criminal statutes, unless it 
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provides that failure to register as a foreign agent within ten days of becoming such an 
agent is a “continuing offense.”103 Title 18 U.S.C. § 3284 provides that concealment of a 
bankruptcy’s assets “shall be deemed to be a continuing offense . . . and the period of 
limitations shall not begin to run until such final discharge or denial of discharge.”  
Most federal criminal offense statutes, however, do not contain explicit language 
addressing whether the offense is a continuing one. Congressional silence in a criminal 
statute, the Supreme Court has held, is “strong[ly] in favor of not construing this Act as 
incorporating a continuing-offense theory.”104 Not surprisingly, most federal criminal 
offenses do not satisfy the first prong of the Toussie test. If the first prong of the Toussie 
test is not satisfied, courts move to the second prong to complete their analysis. 
2. The Toussie Test’s Second Prong: Nature of the Crime 
Under the second Toussie prong, courts must examine the nature of the offense 
alleged and determine whether it is such that Congress “must have assuredly intended” 
that it be treated as continuing.105 With a focus on congressional intent, the second prong 
questions whether there is anything inherent in the offense itself that makes it continuing 
in nature. One indication that the offense might be continuing is that it “clearly 
contemplates a prolonged course of conduct.”106 Courts have considered statutory 
language, structure and purpose,107 legislative history,108 and/or past precedent109 to make 
                                                                                                                                            
has provided contrary instructions. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952) (“[W]here 
Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of 
practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in 
the body of learning from which it was taken and the meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind 
unless otherwise instructed.”); United States v. McGoff, 831 F.3d 1071, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (according 
the term “continuing offense” in 22 U.S.C. § 618(e) its traditional legal meaning after finding no contrary 
instruction from Congress). 
103 22 U.S.C. § 618(e) (2006) provides, “Failure to file any such registration statement or supplements 
thereto as is required by either section 2(a) or section 2(b) [22 U.S.C. § 612(a) or (b)] shall be considered a 
continuing offense for as long as such failure exists, notwithstanding any statute of limitation or other 
statute to the contrary.”; see also 50 U.S.C. § 856 (2006) (“Failure to file a registration statement 
[indicating that one is trained in foreign espionage systems] as required by this Act is a continuing offense 
for as long as such failure exists, notwithstanding any statute of limitation or other statute to the contrary.”). 
104 Toussie, 397 U.S. at 120. After looking to the plain meaning of the statute’s words, some courts will 
look to a statute’s legislative history if the statute’s plain meaning does not address whether an offense is 
continuing. See United States v. Gray, 876 F.2d 1411, 1418–19 (9th Cir. 1989) (“The legislative history of 
the statute also fails to indicate whether failure to appear is a continuing offense.”); United States v. 
Cunningham, 891 F. Supp. 460, 463 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (“[T]here is nothing in the legislative history to either 
section that indicates Congress’ intent in separating theft of mail from delay of mail had anything to do 
with the continuing offense doctrine.”), rev’d on other grounds, 108 F.3d 120 (7th Cir. 1997). The practice 
of looking to the legislative history is a controversial step, however, given its due process implications in 
this context. See McGoff, 831 F.2d at 1084 (“We will . . . look to see what the historical materials suggest, 
but we do so without in any fashion suggesting that which would be extraordinary in a free country ruled 
by law—that [one] could be convicted of a crime by virtue of extra-statutory expressions of legislative 
‘intent’ or, more precisely, ‘meaning’ found in the web of legislative history.”); see also Garcia v. United 
States, 469 U.S. 70, 75 (1984) (“[O]nly the most extraordinary showing of contrary intentions [in the 
legislative history] would justify a limitation on the ‘plain meaning’ of the statutory language.”). 
105 Toussie, 397 U.S. at 115. 
106 Id. at 120. 
107 See United States v. Blizzard, 812 F. Supp. 79, 81 (E.D. Va. 1993) (“The nature of the crime as 
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this determination. In addition, some courts have analyzed whether the dangers posed to 
society by the offense continue in duration,110 given that a continuing offense features “a 
harm that lasts as long as that course of conduct persists.”111  
E. Applying the Toussie Test to Prototypical Continuing Offenses 
Courts have consistently deemed conspiracy, kidnapping, and crimes of possession 
to be continuing offenses. These crimes illustrate a successful application of the second 
Toussie prong such that Congress “must have assuredly intended” that they be treated as 
continuing. 
Conspiracy is widely recognized as the classic example of a continuing offense.112 
While the statutory language of the federal conspiracy offenses would not satisfy the first 
Toussie prong,113 the offenses nevertheless qualify as continuing under the second prong 
because the conspirators’ ongoing actions in pursuit of their conspiratorial agreement 
cause harm that lasts as the course of conduct persists. Indeed, the Supreme Court has 
held: “[i]t is in the nature of a conspiracy that each day’s acts bring a renewed threat of 
the substantive evil Congress sought to prevent.”114 Conspiracy continues as long as the 
                                                                                                                                            
determined from the overall statutory scheme also compels the conclusion that the crime alleged in Count 
II is a continuing offense.”); cf. United States v. Cores, 356 U.S. 405, 408 (1958) (“Section 252(c) [of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1282(c)] punishes ‘any alien crewman who willfully remains 
in the United States in excess of the number of days allowed.’ The conduct proscribed is the affirmative act 
of willfully remaining, and the crucial word ‘remains’ permits no connotation other than continuing 
presence.”). 
108 See United States v. Del Percio, 657 F. Supp. 849, 852 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (“With respect to the second 
[prong], a thorough examination of the legislative history of the Act . . . fails to provide any evidence to 
suggest that the nature of the crimes alleged in this indictment is such that Congress ‘must have assuredly 
intended’ that they be treated as continuing.”) (citation omitted), rev’d in part on other grounds, 870 F.2d 
1090 (6th Cir. 1989). 
109 See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 413 (1980) (observing that “every federal court that has 
considered this issue has held, either explicitly or implicitly, that [18 U.S.C.] § 751(a) defines a continuing 
offense” and holding that escape under § 751(a) is a continuing offense). 
110 The Supreme Court held in Bailey that “the nature of the crime [of escape] is such that Congress must 
assuredly have intended that it be treated as a continuing one” because of the “continuing threat to society 
posed by an escaped prisoner.” Id. at 413 (citation omitted); see also United States v. Audinot, 901 F.2d 
1201, 1203 (3d Cir. 1990) (“We conclude that escape is a continuing offense and that every day away from 
custody serves as a continuing threat to society . . . .”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); 
United States v. Green, 305 F.3d 422, 433 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding that failure to appear is a continuing 
offense because “[e]ach day that the defendant fails to appear enhances the threat and the dangers posed by 
the delay and demonstrates the continuing nature of the offense”). 
111 United States v. Morales, 11 F.3d 915, 921 (9th Cir. 1993).  
112 See United States v. Yashar, 166 F.3d 873, 875 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he classic example of a continuing 
offense is a conspiracy.”); see also United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 610 (1910) (holding that 
conspiracy is a continuing offense); United States v. Jake, 281 F.3d 123, 129 n.6 (3d Cir. 2002). 
Conspiracy crimes involve “the agreement . . . to commit one or more unlawful acts.” Braverman v. United 
States, 317 U.S. 49, 53 (1942). Its unit of prosecution is the criminal agreement. United States v. Felix, 503 
U.S. 378, 391–92 (1992). 
113 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006) (“If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against 
the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, 
and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined under 
this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.”). 
114 Toussie, 397 U.S. at 122. 
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conspirators take any action in furtherance of the conspiracy.115 Hence, given its status as 
a continuing offense, a conspiracy is not complete, and the statute of limitations does not 
begin to run until some affirmative event, such as an arrest, puts an end to the defendant’s 
conspiratorial conduct.116  
Courts similarly classify kidnapping as a continuing offense.117 The federal 
kidnapping statute does not explicitly address continuing offenses;118 but courts have 
concluded that the crime easily qualifies as a continuing offense under Toussie’s second 
prong, stressing the ongoing, involuntary detention of the victim as justification.119 Every 
day the victim is not released, the kidnapper continues to violate the law and harm the 
victim.120 “[T]his is a crime of continuing force upon the person . . . [which keeps] 
parents and family . . . in a constant state of anxiety.”121 The statute of limitations begins 
to run not upon the victim’s abduction and transport, but when the victim is no longer 
held.122  
Courts have almost unanimously identified crimes of possession as continuing 
offenses.123 These offenses “involve the simple and continuous act of possessing a 
contraband item”124 and satisfy the Toussie test’s second prong because the perpetrators 
violate the law every moment they possess the contraband items. The Seventh Circuit has 
reasoned, “[a]dopting [the] position that possession is not a continuing offense would 
enable criminals to keep dangerous and illegal things—guns, drugs, bombs—if they are 
able to conceal them for the statutory limitations period. This result is an obvious 
absurdity.”125 Courts have held that the offenses are complete, and the statute of 
limitations begins to run not when the offender first receives the prohibited item, but 
                                                
115 United States v. Cozzo, No. 2-CR-400-1, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 2, 2003).  
116 United States v. Rastelli, 870 F. 2d 822, 838 (2d Cir. 1989). A conspiracy whose statute requires proof 
of an overt act is complete when the last overt act ends. Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 216 (1946). 
A conspiracy whose statute does not require an overt act continues until the conspiratorial plan is 
abandoned or accomplished. United States v. Coia, 719 F.2d 1120, 1124 (11th Cir. 1983). 
117 See United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. 275, 281 (1999); Yashar, 166 F.3d at 875; Morales, 
11 F.3d at 921. 
118 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2006) provides, in relevant part, “Whoever unlawfully seizes, confines, inveigles, 
decoys, kidnaps, abducts, or carries away and holds for ransom or reward or otherwise any person . . . 
when . . . the person is willfully transported in interstate or foreign commerce . . . shall be punished . . . .” 
119 United States v. Garcia, 854 F.2d 340, 343 (9th Cir. 1988). 
120 United States v. Cunningham, 891 F. Supp. 460, 464 (N.D. Ill. 1995). 
121 Garcia, 854 F.2d at 343 (quoting Parnell v. Superior Court, 173 Cal. Rptr. 906, 915 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1981)). 
122 Id. at 344. 
123 See United States v. Hull, 456 F.3d 133, 146 (3d Cir. 2006) (collecting cases); see also United States v. 
Berndt, 530 F.3d 553, 555 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding a violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), which penalizes the 
possession of an unregistered firearm, is a continuing offense); United States v. Krstic, 558 F.3d 1010, 
1018 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a), which penalizes the possession of 
immigration documents procured by fraud, is a continuing offense); United States v. Winnie, 97 F.3d 975, 
976 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding a violation of 16 U.S.C. 1538(c)(1), which penalizes the possession of illegally 
traded wildlife, is a continuing offense); United States v. Kayfez, 957 F.2d 677, 678 (9th Cir. 1992) (per 
curiam) (holding a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 472, which penalizes the possession of counterfeit notes, is a 
continuing offense). 
124 United States v. Del Percio, 870 F.2d 1090, 1097 (6th Cir. 1989). 
125 Berndt, 530 F.3d at 555. 
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rather when the offender parts with the item.126  
III. ANALYSIS OF THE CONTINUING OFFENSE DOCTRINE IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES: 
JUDICIAL CONFUSION AND OVERBROAD APPLICATION 
A. Overview of the Federal Courts’ Application of the Continuing Offense Doctrine 
Since the Court decided Toussie, the continuing offense doctrine has maintained its 
function as a judicial tool to elongate the running of the statute of limitations. 
Contemporary courts have applied the doctrine unevenly, however, because they often 
have struggled deciding whether a particular crime is a continuing offense. While the 
Supreme Court’s test elucidated in Toussie significantly facilitated the analysis of this 
issue, it by no means resolved it. To be sure, the Toussie test does not generate conflict 
when applied to most crimes. Most federal offenses appear to present minimal conceptual 
issues regarding their inherent nature, and can be easily categorized as discrete.127 
Moreover, the judiciary has employed the continuing offense doctrine routinely to a core 
set of crimes, including conspiracy, possession, and certain status offenses, with nearly 
unanimous agreement among courts.128 In contrast, there is a set of crimes that have 
posed considerable difficulties, and in deciding whether these crimes are continuing, a 
number of federal courts have applied the Toussie test inconsistently, generating 
conflicting case law, circuit splits, and widespread confusion and uncertainty.  
The judicial disagreement surrounding the relationship between this problematic set 
of crimes and the continuing offense doctrine can be largely summarized by two 
divergent approaches taken by courts. The first approach features a set of courts applying 
the Toussie test in a careful and exacting manner, closely following the Supreme Court’s 
strongly worded guidance on the continuing offense doctrine as set forth in the Toussie 
decision.129 The second approach consists of another set of courts that apply the Toussie 
test in a broadly interpretive manner, essentially expanding the continuing offense 
doctrine beyond the principles set forth in Toussie and consequently sidestepping the 
statute of limitations as a bar to prosecution.130  
The remainder of this Part examines how courts have applied the Toussie test, 
identifies the source of the disagreements surrounding the continuing offense doctrine, 
scrutinizes the major judicial disagreements regarding the doctrine, and explores the 
approaches that some contemporary courts have adopted to expand the doctrine.  
B. An Analysis of the Toussie Test: Where Does the Trouble Lie? 
Over three hundred federal court decisions have cited the Supreme Court’s Toussie 
                                                
126 See Krstic, 558 F.3d at 1017. 
127 See supra subpart II.A 
128 See supra subpart II.D.2 (discussing conspiracy, kidnapping, and crimes of possession as continuing 
offenses). 
129 See, e.g., United States v. Green, 305 F.3d 422, 432 (6th Cir. 2002). After carefully implementing both 
prongs of the Toussie analysis and providing substantive analysis, the court in Green held that failure to 
appear under 18 U.S.C. § 3146 is a continuing offense. Id. 
130 See infra subparts III.C & III.D. 
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opinion,131 with a significant subset applying the Toussie test to determine whether the 
pertinent criminal statutes called into question are continuing offenses. An analysis of 
these cases reflects a general pattern of courts implementing the Toussie test’s first prong 
with relative ease, but facing difficulty when applying the second, more nebulous, prong.  
The Toussie test’s first prong has been relatively simple for courts to execute 
because it requires straightforward statutory interpretation.132 One needs only to look at 
the face of the criminal statute for the key language to make this determination. 
Furthermore, the prong’s aim, discerning congressional intent by examining statutory 
language, carries solid intuitive weight as a foundational tenet of statutory 
interpretation.133 As the Tenth Circuit has reasoned, “[i]f Congress intended the [offense 
in question] to be a continuing offense, it could have clearly stated so.”134 Executing the 
first prong has thus been uncontroversial. 
The major issues stemming from judicial interpretation of the Toussie test lie with 
its second prong.135 Deploying this prong is an intrinsically more complex judicial 
undertaking, since courts may consider multiple sources, including legislative text, 
history and purpose, and past precedent, when analyzing the inherent nature of a 
particular crime.136 Moreover, the Supreme Court has not elaborated on precisely how 
one may assess the “nature” of a crime; the notion itself smacks of vagueness. One 
practitioner has criticized the “nature of a crime” concept as “so vague as almost to defy 
analysis.”137 For these reasons, courts have undoubtedly more leeway and less guidance 
in deeming an offense as continuing under the second prong.138  
For roughly the first two decades after the Toussie decision was handed down, most 
federal courts implementing the second prong expressed little disagreement over the 
prong’s operations. They exercised the caution that Toussie calls for, holding the vast 
majority of federal crimes analyzed were not continuing offenses.139 The last two 
                                                
131 Shepard’s Report: Toussie, LEXIS NEXIS (2012). 
132 See supra subpart II.D.1 
133 CSX Transp., Inc. v. Ala. Dep’t. of Revenue, 131 S. Ct. 1101, 1107 (2011) (“We begin, as in any case of 
statutory interpretation, with the language of the statute.”). 
134 United States v. Reitmeyer, 356 F.3d 1313, 1322 (10th Cir. 2004) (quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
135 See supra subpart II.D.2 
136 See United States v. Bundy, No. 08-196, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56466, at *23 (D. Me. Mar. 31, 2009) 
(noting that the Toussie test’s second prong presents a “more difficult” analysis than its first prong); see 
also supra subpart II.D.2. 
137 Benjamin E. Rosenberg, ‘Continuing Crimes’ and Statutes of Limitations, WESTLAW J. WHITE-COLLAR 
CRIME, Dec. 2010, at 4. 
138 The judiciary nevertheless must be mindful of the Supreme Court’s mandate that offenses should be 
deemed continuing only in limited circumstances due to the continuing offense doctrine’s power to forestall 
the running of the limitations period. See Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 116 (1970); see also 
United States v. W.R. Grace, 429 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1240 (D. Mont. 2006) (“In light of the purposes of a 
statute of limitations, which include protection against prosecution for acts done in the distant past and 
insurance against loss of evidence due the passage of time, the continuing offense doctrine applies only in 
rare circumstances.”). 
139 United States v. Morales, 11 F.3d 915, 921 (9th Cir. 1993) (describing United States v. Garcia, 854 F.2d 
340 (9th Cir. 1988), as “one of the very few cases (if not the only case) that has deemed a federal crime a 
continuing offense under the second prong of the Toussie test.”). The Garcia case involved the federal 
crime of kidnapping, discussed in subpart II.D.2. 
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decades, however, have produced an outgrowth of judicial decisions that have applied 
Toussie’s second prong to hold that a number of crimes are continuing offenses.140 The 
trend appears to be increasing, with a number of courts applying the continuing offense 
doctrine with zeal, particularly to white-collar criminal offenses.141 Procedurally, some of 
these decisions reflect jumbled, sloppy, or minimal analysis,142 while others more 
carefully proceed with the Toussie test’s inquiries.143 Taken as a whole, the decisions 
demonstrate a movement in the federal common law towards an expansion of the number 
of crimes treated as continuing offenses.144  
Given the powerful effects of the continuing offense doctrine’s application, 
expanding the number of continuing offenses brings sizable consequences for defendants 
and society. For every offense that is deemed continuing, the statute of limitations will 
not bar prosecution if the alleged criminal conduct extends beyond the statutory 
limitations period.145 A central question arises: what is propelling the growth of 
recognized continuing offenses? An analysis of the case law points to two principal lines 
of cases that have generated a significant portion of this growth. The “charged conduct” 
and the “fraudulent scheme” approaches have significantly expanded the continuing 
offense doctrine beyond the principles enunciated in Toussie. The following two subparts 
examine these approaches and explore whether they are compatible with the Supreme 
Court’s teachings and the principles that support the statutes of limitations. 
                                                
140 See, e.g., United States v. Bell, 598 F.3d 366, 369 (7th Cir. 2010) (failure to pay child support under 18 
U.S.C. § 228 is a continuing offense); United States v. Merino, 44 F.3d 749, 753 (9th Cir. 1994) (failure to 
appear for sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a) is a continuing offense); United States v. Mermelstein, 
487 F. Supp. 2d 242, 256 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (making false statements under 18 U.S.C. § 1035 may be 
charged as a continuing offense). 
141 See, e.g., United States v. Aliperti, 867 F. Supp. 142, 147 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding extortion under 18 
U.S.C.S. § 1951 is a continuing offense); United States v. Anderson, 995 F. Supp. 944, 949 (C.D. Ill. 1998) 
(bank fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1344 is a continuing offense); United States v. Gibson, No. 08-030570, 2008 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119120, at *5 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 12, 2008) (embezzlement under 18 U.S.C. § 641 is a 
continuing offense). 
142 See, e.g., Morales, 11 F.3d at 917–18. The court in Morales treated a bribery conviction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 201 as a continuing offense merely because “the charged criminal conduct extends over a period of time.” 
Id. at 918. As noted by Judge O’Scannlain in dissent, the Morales court failed to recognize or analyze 
properly the continuing offense doctrine or the Supreme Court’s guidance in Toussie. Id. at 919–20. 
143 Compare United States v. Dixon, 551 F.3d 578, 582 (7th Cir. 2008) (concluding that a violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 2250 is a continuing offense, without referencing Toussie or analyzing the text or purpose of 18 
U.S.C. § 2250) with United States v. Hinckley, 550 F.3d 926, 936 (10th Cir. 2008) (concluding that a 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250 is a continuing offense based upon a Toussie test second prong analysis and 
prior judicial findings). See also United States v. Gomez, 38 F.3d 1031, 1034–35 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding, 
in a summary manner without putting forth reasoning or an analysis under Toussie, that a violation under 8 
U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) is a continuing offense).  
144 While the Supreme Court recognized in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938), that “[t]here is 
no federal general common law,” a specialized body of federal common law still exists. Am. Elec. Power 
Co. v. Conn., 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2535 (2011). This “new federal common law addresses subjects within 
national legislative power where Congress has so directed or where the basic scheme of the Constitution so 
demands.” Id. Federal courts’ decisions that address whether certain federal crimes are continuing offenses 
represent part of this body of specialized federal common law. 
145 See supra subpart II.B 
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C. Courts Adopting the Charged Conduct Approach Have Significantly Distorted the 
Continuing Offense Doctrine 
Many cases that have arguably misapplied the continuing offense doctrine can be 
best described as following a “charged conduct” approach. The approach has 
fundamentally altered the continuing offense doctrine as applied to a number of federal 
crimes, creating disorder in what had otherwise been a relatively settled area of law. By 
shifting courts’ attention from discerning congressional intent to analyzing the language 
of the charging document, the charged conduct approach has muddled the Toussie 
analysis, engendered confusion over Toussie’s application, and caused a split among the 
circuit courts.146 
This “charged conduct” approach focuses on the defendant’s conduct alleged by the 
prosecutor in the charging document. The approach’s basic tenet maintains that no 
criminal conduct described in the charging document, as reflected by a single-count 
violation committed outside the applicable limitations period, should be barred by the 
statute of limitations when that conduct is part of a larger pattern of violations some of 
which occur within the limitations period.147 The cases adopting the charged conduct 
approach generally reflect a similar procedural pattern: the government accuses the 
defendant of a repeated course of conduct spanning a period of time and aggregates the 
alleged conduct into a single count in the indictment. Part of the conduct falls outside of 
the applicable limitations period, and the defendant raises a statute of limitations defense. 
The prosecutor argues, in turn, that the defendant’s conduct should be viewed as one 
overall pattern or scheme (typically expressed as such via the single-count charge) and 
that because the limitations period encompasses some of the conduct, the continuing 
offense doctrine should apply to the offense and insulate the count from a statute of 
limitations challenge.148  
The charged conduct approach has divided the judiciary. Some courts have 
endorsed the approach, treating the charged conduct at issue as continuous in nature 
under the second prong of Toussie and rejecting a limitations defense.149 Other courts 
have rebuffed the approach outright, concluding that it is squarely at odds with Toussie 
and other Supreme Court precedent.150 Conflicting case law has spread into many areas 
of criminal jurisprudence, as courts have clashed in addressing the charged conduct 
approach to a number of offenses, including bribery, forgery, and tax evasion.151 The 
                                                
146 See United States v. Phan, 754 F. Supp. 2d 186, 189 (D. Mass. 2010) (noting the circuit split and 
collecting cases). 
147 See United States v. Sunia, 643 F. Supp. 2d 51, 72 (D.D.C. 2009) (describing the charged conduct 
approach).  
148 For an example of the typical procedural posture of the charged conduct approach, see United States v. 
Smith, 373 F.3d 561, 563–64 (4th Cir. 2004). 
149 See, e.g., id. at 564 (holding that the crime at issue be treated as a continuing offense). 
150 See, e.g., United States v. Yashar, 166 F.3d 873, 875 (7th Cir. 1999) (rejecting a charged conduct 
argument and holding that embezzlement under 18 U.S.C. § 666 is not a continuing offense). 
151 Compare United States v. Morales, 11 F.3d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 1993) (following the charged conduct 
approach and upholding a bribery conviction based on bribes charged under a single count that occurred 
before and after the effective date under the sentencing guidelines) with Sunia, 643 F. Supp. 2d at 69–70 
(rejecting the charged conduct approach as applied to a bribery charge). See also United States v. Kirkman, 
755 F. Supp. 304, 306–08 (D. Idaho 1991) (rejecting a charged conduct argument and holding that tax 
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judicial divide is perhaps best reflected in the federal embezzlement case law, where 
circuit courts are split over whether certain federal embezzlement crimes are continuing 
offenses for statute of limitations purposes.152 
1. The Development of the Charged Conduct Approach Through the Lens of 
Embezzlement 
In order to understand the growth of the charged conduct approach and its impact, 
one can look to the controversy surrounding the federal embezzlement statute of 
conversion under 18 U.S.C. § 641, where the government has vigorously argued that the 
crime is a continuing offense under the charged conduct approach.153 The pertinent 
language of the statute provides:  
Whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly converts to his use . . . 
any record, voucher, money, or thing of value of the United States or of 
any department or agency thereof . . . [is guilty of a crime].154 
There are three elements required for a conviction under this section of the statute: (1) a 
specific intent to (2) make a knowing conversion (3) of governmental property.155 
The first reported case addressing the issue of whether embezzlement, under § 641, 
is a continuing offense, United States v. Beard, held in the negative.156 While 
implementing the Toussie test, the Beard court held that, for purposes of the second 
prong, a § 641 offense is complete upon the initial interference with the government’s 
property interest (i.e., at the moment when all of the elements are first met). It then 
concluded that nothing in the nature of the crime indicated that Congress must have 
intended for it to be treated as a continuing offense.157  
Fifteen years after the Beard decision, the Fourth Circuit transformed the landscape 
with its decision in United States v. Smith,158 igniting a movement favoring the “charged 
conduct approach.” In Smith, the defendant Alfred Smith’s mother received benefit 
payments from the Social Security Administration that were electronically deposited into 
                                                                                                                                            
evasion is not a continuing offense); United States v. Jaynes, 75 F.3d 1493, 1506–07 (10th Cir. 1996) 
(discussing whether forgery is a continuing offense under the charged conduct approach). 
152 See supra note 146 and accompanying text (discussing the circuit split). 
153 See United States v. Gibson, No. 08-030570, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119120, at *4 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 12, 
2008) (adopting the prosecution’s charged conduct position and holding that 18 U.S.C. § 641 is a 
continuing offense). 
154 18 U.S.C. § 641 (2006); see also United States v. Beard, 713 F. Supp. 285, 287 (S.D. Ind. 1989). Section 
641 prohibits two separate and distinct forms of conduct, known within the case law as the “first 
paragraph” and “second paragraph” prohibitions. Id. The continuing offense controversy concerns § 641’s 
first paragraph, and as such, references to § 641 within this Article address the first paragraph offense only. 
155 Id. at 288–89.  
156 See id. at 290–91 (noting that “[n]o reported cases have expressly addressed the question of whether 
conversion under paragraph one of section 641 is a continuing offense” and holding that the crime is not a 
continuing offense). 
157 Id. at 290. In Beard, the government did not raise a charged conduct argument but instead analogized a § 
641 violation to the crime of joyriding. Id. The court rejected the government’s analogy. Id. at 291. 
158 United States v. Smith, 373 F.3d 561, 561 (4th Cir. 2004). 
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a bank account jointly held with the defendant.159 Smith’s mother died on February 4, 
1994, and Smith did not report the death of his mother to the Social Security 
Administration.160 From March 1994 through February 1998, the Social Security 
Administration continued issuing payments that were electronically deposited into 
Smith’s joint account with his mother.161 During this time, Smith wrote checks and 
withdrew funds from the account.162 In all, he received forty-eight payments, totaling 
approximately $26,336, after his mother’s death.163 On January 24, 2003, he was charged, 
in a single-count indictment, with violating 18 U.S.C. § 641 by operating a scheme to 
embezzle his mother’s payments on a recurring basis.164  
Smith opposed the aggregation of his acts into a single count, arguing that the 
single-count indictment impermissibly joined separate acts that occurred at different 
times. He also argued that the statute of limitations barred prosecution of the earlier acts 
because those acts fell outside of the applicable five-year limitations period.165 The 
Fourth Circuit rejected this argument. Addressing the aggregation, the court held that if a 
defendant executed “a plan or scheme or [set] up a mechanism which, when put into 
operation, [would] result in the taking or diversion of sums of money on a recurring 
basis, the crime may be charged in a single count.” The court decided that Smith’s failure 
to report his mother’s death evidenced intent to establish a mechanism for the continuous 
and automatic receipt of funds for an indefinite period.166 It held that Smith’s alleged 
conduct was properly aggregated into a single count.167 
Addressing Smith’s statute of limitations argument, the Fourth Circuit reasoned 
that the indictment would be sufficient if embezzlement can be treated as a continuing 
offense. The court held that “the nature of embezzlement is such that Congress must have 
intended that, in some circumstances, it be treated in § 641 as a continuing offense.”168 It 
reasoned:  
Embezzlement is the type of crime that, to avoid detection, often occurs 
over some time and in relatively small, but recurring, amounts. . . . At least 
in those cases where the defendant created a recurring, automatic scheme 
of embezzlement under § 641 by conversion of funds voluntarily placed in 
the defendant’s possession by the government, and maintained that 
                                                






165 United States v. Smith, 373 F.3d 561, 563 (4th Cir. 2004). Violations of 18 U.S.C. § 641 are governed 
by a five-year statute of limitations. See 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (2006). The five-year limitations period in Smith 
ran from January 24, 2008 to January 24, 2003, the date of the indictment. Smith, 373 F.3d at 570. Some of 
Smith’s conduct occurred within the limitations period, as he received his final payment on February 3, 
1998. Id. at 568. 
166 Id. at 564 (quotation marks and citation omitted). In order to determine whether Smith’s series of 
takings were properly aggregated, the court cited to United States v. Billingslea, 603 F.2d 515, 520 (5th Cir. 
1979) for the premise that it must examine the intent of the actor at the first taking. 
167 Smith, 373 F.3d at 568. 
168 Id. at 564. 
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scheme without need for affirmative acts linked to any particular receipt of 
funds . . . we think that Congress must have intended that such be 
considered a continuing offense for purposes of the statute of 
limitations.169 
The court’s holding reflects a charged conduct approach because it looks to the 
charged conduct in the indictment and holds that recurring criminal acts that transpire 
over an extended period (with some acts occurring outside the limitations period) may be 
treated as a single continuing offense for limitations purposes.  
Shortly after Smith was decided, the Ninth Circuit also adopted a charged conduct 
approach in United States v. Neusom.170 The defendant, James Neusom, had appealed his 
§ 641 conviction, arguing that the conviction was barred by the statute of limitations. 
Neusom allegedly received improper Social Security payments from December 1993 to 
June 2001, and the prosecution aggregated the improper payment violations into one 
§ 641 count.171 A five-year statute of limitations governed the indictment, filed on 
February 28, 2003.172 Neusom argued that only violations completed after February 28, 
1998 could be prosecuted, and that his conviction was barred by the statute of limitations 
because the charge involved conduct that straddled the limitations date. Mirroring Smith, 
the court held that, given the nature of Neusom’s recurring actions as set forth in the 
indictment, the violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641 at issue constituted a continuing offense. 
With minimal analysis, the court found no plain error and affirmed Neusom’s 
conviction.173  
District courts across several jurisdictions have joined the Fourth and Ninth 
Circuits in holding that a violation of § 641, as described in the language of the charging 
document, constitutes a continuing offense.174 All of the rendered decisions feature a 
charging document with a single-count violation of § 641 alleging unlawful payments 
spanning a period exceeding five years. These payments straddled the applicable five-
year limitations period, thus setting up a conflict with the statute of limitations. The 
conflict is obvious when one examines the government’s alternative charging option. Had 
the government chosen, in any of these cases, to charge a single indictment count for 
each individual § 641 violation (i.e., one count for each unlawful payment received), the 
statute of limitations would plainly bar the counts involving actions occurring prior to the 
                                                
169 Id. at 567–68. The court qualified its decision, noting, “This is not to say that all conduct constituting 
embezzlement may necessarily be treated as a continuing offense as opposed to merely ‘a series of acts that 
occur over a period of time’; indeed, it may well be that different embezzlement conduct must be 
differently characterized in this regard.” Id. at 568. 
170 159 F. App’x 796 (9th Cir. 2005). 
171 Id. at 798. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 798–99. 
174 See United States v. Easley, No. 4:10CR00240-01, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61207, at *7 (E.D. Ark. June 
8, 2011); United States v. Phan, 754 F. Supp. 2d 186, 189 (D. Mass. 2010); United States v. Street, No. 
3:07CR181TSL, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71331, at *11 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 19, 2008); United States v. 
Gibson, No. 08-030570, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119120, at *5 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 12, 2008); United States v. 
Thompkins, No. 1:08CR, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59255, at *5–6 (W.D. N.C. Aug. 5, 2008); United States 
v. Miller, 200 F. Supp. 2d 616, 619 (S.D. W.Va. 2002); United States v. Aubrey, 53 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1356 
(E.D. Tex. 1999). 
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five-year limitations period. Because the government elected, in these cases, to aggregate 
the § 641 violations into a single count, it was able to utilize the charged conduct 
approach to argue that a continuous course of deliberative conduct occurred in violation 
of § 641, which in turn created a continuing offense. 
Not all courts have elected to follow the charged conduct approach when deciding 
whether federal embezzlement crimes are continuing offenses. Indeed, other federal 
appellate courts have flatly rejected it and held that embezzlement is not a continuing 
offense under the Toussie analysis. The Second Circuit, in United States v. Silkowski, 
held that a one-count violation of § 641 is not a continuing offense “regardless of the 
language contained in the underlying charging document.”175 In United States v. 
Yashar,176 the Seventh Circuit similarly rebuffed the charged conduct approach in 
concluding that 18 U.S.C. § 666, the embezzlement criminal statute at issue and 
analogous to 18 U.S.C. § 641, did not state a continuing offense under Toussie.177 
Numerous district courts have joined the Second and Seventh Circuits with similar 
holdings.178 These courts essentially echo the earlier holding in Beard that nothing in the 
nature of embezzlement itself indicates that Congress must have intended for it to be 
treated as a continuing offense.179  
When analyzing the charged conduct approach through the lens of embezzlement, 
several conclusions may be made. Smith, Neusom, and their progeny are part of a larger 
set of judicial opinions that firmly establishes the charged conduct approach as a tool for 
prosecutors. To repel potential statute of limitations barriers, prosecutors, under this line 
of case law, are able to argue in the charging document that the alleged violations are part 
of a continuous pattern yielding one continuing crime. The embezzlement case law 
demonstrates the charged conduct approach’s power as a trigger for the continuing 
offense doctrine to operate and dispel a statute of limitations argument. Prosecutors have 
                                                
175 United States v. Silkowski, 32 F.3d 682, 690 (2d Cir. 1994). The defendant in Silkowski pled guilty to an 
information charging one count of violating § 641 for receiving improperly Social Security benefits issued 
to his ex-wife and to his daughter for over ten years. Id. at 684. 
176 166 F.3d 873, 879–80 (7th Cir. 1999). 
177 In Yashar, the defendant Michael Yashar was charged with embezzlement of more than $5000 during a 
one-year period from September 1, 1991 to September 1, 1992, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666, which 
makes it a federal crime for a government official to embezzle government property that is valued at more 
than $5000 during any one-year period. Id. at 875. The effective date of his indictment was August 13, 
1997. Id. Yashar moved to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds because the indictment failed to allege 
that he embezzled the requisite $5000 amount between August 13, 1992 and September 1, 1992, and that 
the applicable five-year statute of limitations barred any actions preceding August 13, 1992. Id. 
178 See United States v. Sunia, 643 F. Supp. 2d 51, 75 (D.D.C. 2009) (embezzlement under 18 U.S.C. § 666 
is not a continuing offense); United States v. Rivlin, No. 07-Cr-524, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89323, at *15 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2007) (embezzlement under 18 U.S.C. § 664 is not a continuing offense); United States 
v. Duhamel, No. 10-CR-203, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28076, at *6 (D. Me. Mar. 18, 2011) (holding that 
embezzlement provision of § 641 does not state a continuing offense); United States v. Young, 694 F. 
Supp. 2d 25, 29 (D. Me. 2010) (same); United States v. Bundy, No. 08-196, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56466, 
at *25 (D. Me. Mar. 31, 2009) (same); United States v. Pease, No. 07-757, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27331, 
at *8 (D. Ariz. March 24, 2008) (same); United States v. Beard, 713 F. Supp. 285, 291 (S.D. Ind. 1989) 
(same). 
179 See Beard, 713 F. Supp. at 290–91 (noting that “[n]o reported cases have expressly addressed the 
question of whether conversion under paragraph one of section 641 is a continuing offense” and holding 
that the crime is not a continuing offense). 
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already used the charged conduct approach with several other criminal offenses where 
multiple alleged violations existed, construing them in the charging document as one 
continuous pattern yielding one continuing crime, often successfully.180 
2. Courts Err When Adopting the Charged Conduct Approach to Determine Whether an 
Offense Is Continuing 
The charged conduct approach suffers from multiple shortcomings, and there are 
compelling reasons to reject it as a misleading standard that improperly disregards vital 
legislative and judicial policies. The approach subverts the common law definition of a 
continuing offense, flatly contradicts Supreme Court precedent, undermines the intent of 
Congress and the policies behind statutes of limitations, and provides too much power to 
prosecutors. 
The charged conduct approach has altered the meaning of a continuing offense as it 
has been understood in the federal common law. Under the approach, a continuing 
offense is simply a crime that “continues in a factual sense . . . where a defendant engages 
in a course of conduct comprised of repeated criminal violations . . . .”181 The approach 
bestows the term “continuing offense” with its everyday meaning; a continuing offense 
under the approach is, in essence, simply a pattern of repeated criminal violations. This 
conceptualization flies in the face of the term’s common law definition. As explained by 
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, “[a] continuing offense is not the same as a scheme 
or pattern of illegal conduct. [It] is a term of art that does not depend on everyday notions 
or ordinary meaning.”182 The federal common law has defined a continuing offense as an 
offense that Congress legally defines as continuing,183 and the offense generally involves 
continuous conduct “set on foot by a single impulse and operated by an unintermittent 
force”184 that causes continuous harm.185 Thus, the charged conduct approach’s definition 
of a continuing offense, merely a repeated pattern of criminal violations, demonstrates a 
misunderstanding of the term as it has been used in the federal common law. 
The charged conduct approach also ignores the Supreme Court’s directives for 
determining whether an offense is continuing. In Toussie, the Court instructed courts to 
find a continuing offense “only in limited circumstances,” namely if the offense satisfies 
either the first or second prong in the Toussie test; both prongs solely focus on the 
language and meaning of the criminal statute at issue in an effort to discern congressional 
intent.186 The charged conduct approach, with its spotlight on the factual allegations 
contained in the charging document, transfers the focus of the continuing offense 
                                                
180 See supra note 151 and accompanying text (providing instances where the charged conduct approach 
has been applied to additional criminal offenses). 
181 Rivlin, 2007 U.S. Dist. 89323, at *6–7 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
182 United States v. Jaynes, 75 F.3d 1493, 1506 (10th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and 
citation omitted). 
183 Pease, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27331, at *4 (explaining that a continuing offense “does not merely mean 
an offense that continues in a factual sense . . . but instead means a substantive criminal offense that 
Congress established as continuing.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted).  
184 Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 136 (1970). 
185 United States v. Morales, 11 F.3d 915, 921 (9th Cir. 1993). 
186 Toussie, 397 U.S. at 121; see supra subpart II.D (explaining the Supreme Court’s continuing offense test 
under Toussie). 
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assessment from the congressional intent inherent in a criminal statute to the particular 
charged conduct in a given case.187 Under this approach, determining whether an offense 
is continuing depends upon “the manner in which the offense is committed.”188  
This alteration plainly violates the precepts of Toussie and the will of Congress. 
“The goal of the Toussie test is to ascertain what Congress ‘must assuredly have 
intended’ with respect to the application of the statute of limitations to the legal definition 
of the offense; there is nothing about the specific conduct charged in a given case that 
could possibly shed light on Congress’ intent.”189 The charged conduct approach, in 
effect, creates a third prong for the Toussie test: whether the conduct alleged in the 
charging document is continuous.190 Such a prong would functionally eradicate Toussie’s 
second prong because a court would not need to examine a statute in order to determine 
the nature of the criminal offense (under the second prong) if the prosecutor’s charging 
document simply listed criminal conduct that recurred over time.191 
In addition, the charged conduct approach flouts the Supreme Court’s directives in 
Bailey for detecting a continuing offense.192 The Court held, in Bailey, that a continuing 
offense creates a “continuing threat to society.”193 In other words, if an offense is 
continuing, it causes renewed harm194 each day it continues.195 The charged conduct 
approach ignores this definitive feature of a continuing offense when it dictates, with 
broad brush, that in order to qualify as such an offense, the criminal course of conduct 
charged merely needs to continue over time.196 The charged conduct argument is 
logically unsound, as a pattern of discrete criminal violations, recurring over time, does 
                                                
187 See United States v. W.R. Grace, 429 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1241 (D. Mont. 2006); United States v. Yashar, 
166 F.3d 873, 877 (7th Cir. 1999). 
188 United States v. Smith, 373 F.3d 561, 569 (4th Cir. 2004). 
189 W.R. Grace, 429 F. Supp. 2d at 1243; see also United States v. Sunia, 643 F. Supp. 2d 51, 58 (D.D.C. 
2009) (“[T]he salient inquiry is not whether an offense can be concealed for an extended period of time or 
repeated ad infinitum under a particular set of circumstances, but whether there is something inherent in the 
nature of the offense that makes it a continuing one.”) (internal quotation marks, brackets and citation 
omitted). 
190 Yashar, 166 F.3d at 877. 
191 Id.  
192 In Bailey, the Supreme Court recognized escape from federal custody as a continuing offense. United 
States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 413 (1980) (“First, we think it clear beyond peradventure that escape from 
federal custody as defined in § 751(a) is a continuing offense and that an escapee can be held liable for 
failure to return to custody as well as for his initial departure.”). The defendants in Bailey were indicted for 
violating the federal custody statute after escaping from a District of Columbia jail. See id. at 396. The 
Court acknowledged the defendants’ argument that Toussie calls for restraint in labeling crimes as 
continuing offenses, but it reasoned,  
The justification for that restraint, however, is the tension between the doctrine of continuing 
offenses and the policy of repose embodied in statutes of limitations. This tension is wholly absent 
where, as in the case of § 751(a), the statute of limitations is tolled for the period that the escapee 
remains at large. 
Id. at 413–14. 
193 Bailey, 444 U.S. at 413. 
194 See supra note 66 (discussing the use of the term “harm” in the context of the continuing offense 
doctrine). 
195 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.  
196 See supra subpart III.C (explaining the continuing offense definition under the charged conduct 
approach). 
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not equate to a single criminal act that “brings into being an enduring illegality that 
intensifies with the passage of each new day irrespective of any new criminal 
conduct,”197 such as the continuing offense of kidnapping.  
The Fourth Circuit’s holding in Smith—that embezzlement is a continuing offense 
when a “recurring, automatic scheme” is present but may not be continuing when 
“different embezzlement conduct” is present198—plainly contravenes the directive in 
Toussie that courts should focus solely on statutory meaning and congressional intent.199 
Toussie never suggests that a particular offense may be continuing under some 
circumstances but not others, all depending on the conduct charged. Moreover, the nature 
of embezzlement is such that it does not transpire necessarily over a prolonged period of 
time causing renewed harm as each day passes. Hence, none of the elements to an 
embezzlement offense reflect a continuing quality or aspect that would satisfy the Toussie 
test’s second prong.200 In other words, embezzlement, by its elements, is a discrete crime 
completed through an individual transaction, and nothing intrinsically makes it a 
prolonged course of conduct.201 When faced with deciding whether an embezzlement 
statute is a continuing offense under the Toussie standard, courts should focus on the 
nature of the elements of the offense, not how the offense was committed in the particular 
case at hand. 
Compounding matters is the unfair advantage the charged conduct approach creates 
for prosecutors and the harmful practical effects it brings to the statute of limitations’ 
operation. By focusing on the content of the charging document, the charged conduct 
approach transfers an excessive amount of power to the prosecutor. The prosecutor is 
able to control whether the offense will be deemed continuing by including the 
appropriate single-count language in the charging document.202 The prosecutor has the 
option of either aggregating multiple violations of a criminal statute into a single count 
(thereby creating a continuing offense under the charged conduct approach) or charging 
the violations as multiple separate counts. The decision, in turn, could determine when 
the limitations period for each count would begin to run. In essence, if the court follows 
the charged conduct approach, the prosecutor would ultimately decide when the 
limitations period would begin to run.203 The limitations period is “virtually 
unbounded”204 with such a possibility, which diverges from the congressional and 
                                                
197 United States v. Young, No. 09-cr-140, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6824, at *7 (D. Me. Jan. 25, 2010). 
198 United States v. Smith, 373 F.3d 561, 567–68 (4th Cir. 2004). 
199 See United States v. Sunia, 643 F. Supp. 2d 51, 58 (D.D.C. 2009) (“The mere fact that the Fourth Circuit 
could conceive of ‘different embezzlement conduct’ that ‘must be differently characterized in this regard’ 
dispels any notion that ‘Congress must assuredly have intended that [the offense] be treated as a continuing 
one.’”) (citations omitted). 
200 See supra note 155 and accompanying text (discussing the general elements of an embezzlement 
offense).  
201 See Smith, 373 F.3d at 569 (Michael, J., dissenting) (explaining that embezzlement is a discrete crime). 
202 See United States v. Yashar, 166 F.3d 873, 879 (7th Cir. 1999) (describing abilities of the prosecution). 
203 See supra subpart II.B (discussing the mechanics regarding limitations periods and the continuing 
offense doctrine); see also Yashar, 166 F.3d at 878 (observing the prosecutor’s influence in determining the 
running of the limitations period); United States v. W.R. Grace, 429 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1243 (D. Mont. 
2006) (discussing the impact of a prosecutor’s abilities). 
204 Yashar, 166 F.3d at 879. 
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Supreme Court dictates regarding the statute of limitations.205 Whether the statute of 
limitations bars the prosecution of a stale offense should not be dependent upon the 
prosecutor’s charging language in a particular case. 
When the government argues for a continuing offense under the charged conduct 
approach, courts should follow the only sensible path by both abiding by the Supreme 
Court’s directives in Toussie and rejecting the charged conduct approach as an improper 
method for determining whether an offense is continuing. The result will protect 
defendants’ rights and will not disadvantage the prosecution, as a court may simply 
truncate the charged offense to the period that falls within the applicable statute of 
limitations.206 
D. Courts Adopting the Fraudulent Scheme Approach Have Misapplied the Supreme 
Court’s Toussie Test and Improperly Concluded Fraud Crimes Are Continuing Offenses 
The second major problematic area developing within the continuing offense case 
law involves federal crimes of fraud. While the commission of fraud traditionally has 
been viewed as discrete in nature for statute of limitations purposes,207 a number of cases 
have concluded that fraud crimes are continuing offenses. These cases use a novel 
analysis that can be best characterized as a “fraudulent scheme” approach. The approach 
essentially dictates that the presence of the word “scheme” in a criminal statute 
demonstrates congressional intent for the crime to be treated as a continuing offense 
because the ordinary meaning of “scheme” signifies ongoing behavior.208 Thus, under the 
fraudulent scheme approach, the statute of limitations begins to run once the scheme 
comes to an end. Though not as widespread in influence as the charged conduct 
approach, the fraudulent scheme approach nevertheless is impacting the judiciary’s 
treatment of fraud crimes that transpire over time. This section explores the fraudulent 
scheme approach, highlights the circuit splits it has caused, explores its troublesome 
reasoning, and offers a solution to resolve the discord it has generated. 
                                                
205 As explained in supra subpart I.D, Congress has declared a policy in 18 U.S.C. § 3282 that statutes of 
limitations are not to be extended “except as otherwise provided by law,” and the Supreme Court has 
stressed that statutes of limitations are to be strictly construed in favor of defendants. 
206 See United States v. Duhamel, No. 10-CR-203, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28076, at *6 (D. Me. Mar. 18, 
2011) (truncating the charged conduct to the period falling within the five-year statute of limitations for a 
set of embezzlement violations, after finding that the particular embezzlement crime is not a continuing 
offense). As noted by the Duhamel court, a “ruling limiting the temporal scope of [an] Indictment does not 
foreclose the Government from seeking to introduce evidence of actions taken prior to [the beginning of the 
limitations period], so long as the Government establishes that the evidence is relevant and otherwise 
admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence.” Id. at *6–7. This additional factor further alleviates any 
harm to the prosecution if a court rejects the charged conduct approach and truncates the temporal scope of 
the charging document. 
207 See, e.g., United States v. Niven, 952 F.2d 289, 293 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that mail and wire fraud are 
not continuing offenses); United States v. St. Gelais, 952 F.2d 90, 96 (5th Cir. 1992) (concluding that wire 
fraud is not a continuing offense). 
208 See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1219 (3d ed. 1993) (defining “scheme” as, inter 
alia, “[a] systematic plan of action”). 
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1. Fraud Crimes and the Development of the Fraudulent Scheme Approach 
Fraud crimes, under federal law, generally follow a similar statutory structure.209 
The mail fraud,210 wire fraud,211 bank fraud,212 health care fraud,213 and Major Fraud 
Act214 statutes penalize the execution or attempted execution of a fraudulent scheme. 
Prosecutors have utilized the fraudulent scheme approach to argue that each of these 
crimes is a continuing offense for statute of limitations purposes, with varying degrees of 
success. 
i. Mail and Wire Fraud Are Not Continuing Offenses 
The federal mail and wire fraud statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343 respectively, 
punish the use of the mail and wires in furtherance of a scheme to defraud.215 Their 
purpose is to prevent the use of the post office and communications media 
correspondingly as a means to effectuate fraud.216 Courts in near unison agree that 
(1) given the plain language of the statutes and the statutes’ purpose, the discrete mailing 
or wire transmission, not the scheme, is the gist of the offense;217 and, similarly, (2) each 
mailing or wire transmission creates a separate offense, even though the defendant may 
be engaged in a fraudulent scheme that transpires over a prolonged period of time.218 The 
                                                
209 See United States v. Refert, No. 05-30090, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 548, at *5 (D.S.D. Jan. 3, 2007) 
(“The health care fraud statute is modeled after the bank fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1344, and the bank fraud 
statute was modeled after the federal mail and wire fraud statutes, §§ 1341 and 1343.”) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted); United States v. Reitmeyer, 356 F.3d 1313, 1317–18 (10th Cir. 2004) 
(discussing the similar structure and “nearly identical language” of the bank fraud statute and Major Fraud 
Act). 
210 The mail fraud statute provides in pertinent part, “Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any 
scheme or artifice to defraud, . . . places in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any 
matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service . . . shall be fined . . . or imprisoned 
. . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006). 
211 The wire fraud statute provides in pertinent part, “Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any 
scheme or artifice to defraud, . . . transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or 
television communication . . . any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing 
such scheme or artifice, shall be fined . . . or imprisoned . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2006). 
212 The bank fraud statute provides in pertinent part, “Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, 
a scheme or artifice—(1) to defraud a financial institution; or (2) to obtain any of the moneys . . . of a 
financial institution, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises; shall be fined 
. . . or imprisoned . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006). 
213 The health care fraud statute provides in pertinent part, “Whoever knowingly and willfully executes, or 
attempts to execute, a scheme or artifice . . . to defraud any health care benefit program . . . in connection 
with the delivery of or payment for health care benefits, items, or services, shall be fined . . . or imprisoned 
. . .” 18 U.S.C. § 1347 (2006). 
214 The Major Fraud Act provides in pertinent part, “Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, 
any scheme or artifice . . . to defraud the United States . . . shall . . . be fined . . . or imprisoned . . . .” 18 
U.S.C. § 1031 (2006). 
215 United States v. Donahue, 539 F.2d 1131, 1135 (8th Cir. 1976). The mail and wire fraud statutes are in 
pari materia and consequently are given the same construction. Id. See supra notes 210–211 for the 
pertinent language of these statutes. 
216 Parr v. United States, 363 U.S. 370, 389 (1960). 
217 See, e.g., Rude v. United States, 74 F.2d 673, 675 (1935) (“[T]he gist of the [mail fraud] offense is the 
use of the mail for the purpose of executing or attempting to execute such scheme . . . .”). 
218 United States v. Calvert, 523 F.2d 895, 913–14 (8th Cir. 1975) (“It is well settled that each use of the 
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crimes are thus complete at the time of the execution (i.e., the mailing or wire 
transmission).219 “The actual duration of the scheme is of no import.”220 For these 
reasons, courts have routinely and correctly held that mail and wire fraud are discrete and 
not continuing offenses for statute of limitations purposes under a Toussie test analysis,221 
and the statute of limitations commences at the time of the mailing or wire transmission, 
not when the fraudulent scheme ends.222 Case law addressing the Major Fraud Act has 
reached the same conclusion.223 
One court has held to the contrary. The Tenth Circuit concluded in United States v. 
Williams that wire fraud is a continuing offense for statute of limitations purposes. The 
opinion introduced the fraudulent scheme approach into the wire fraud case law.224 The 
defendant Larry Williams was indicted for wire fraud based on an alleged scheme to 
defraud his employer. The scheme involved Williams wiring company funds to his 
personal bank accounts from the beginning of August 1999 through July 26, 2006.225 
Indicted on September 16, 2008, Williams argued that the applicable five-year statute of 
limitations barred restitution for any wire transmitted before September 2003.226 The 
court disagreed, adopting a fraudulent scheme approach through its reasoning that the 
wire fraud statute “focuses on the scheme itself, and not individual executions of that 
scheme.”227 The court found that the limitations period began when Williams was caught 
on July 26, 2006.228 The court’s logic is puzzling, given that the explicit language of the 
wire fraud statute specifically punishes the wire transmission, not the existence of a 
                                                                                                                                            
mails is a separate offense under the mail fraud statute, notwithstanding the fact that the defendant may 
have been engaged in one fraudulent scheme. . . . The same is true of the use of the wires under the wire 
fraud statute.”); see also United States v. St. Gelais, 952 F.2d 90, 97 (5th Cir. 1992) (“It is not the scheme 
to defraud but the use of the mails or wires that constitutes mail or wire fraud.”). 
219 United States v. Niven, 952 F.2d 289, 293 (9th Cir. 1991). 
220 United States v. Barger, 178 F.3d 844, 847 (7th Cir. 1999). 
221 See, e.g., Niven, 952 F.2d at 293 (holding that mail and wire fraud are not continuing offenses); United 
States v. Scarano, 975 F.2d 580, 585 (9th Cir. 1992) (same); St. Gelais, 952 F.2d at 96 (holding that wire 
fraud is not a continuing offense); United States v. Miro, 29 F.3d 194, 198 (5th Cir. 1994) 
(“Notwithstanding the continuing nature of the scheme itself, each mailing constitutes a completed 
offense.”); Barger, 178 F.3d at 847 (“Mail fraud is not an offense listed as a ‘continuing offense’ whose 
statute of limitations begins at the end of a continuous course of criminal conduct.”). 
222 United States v. Lowry, 409 F. Supp. 2d 732, 738 (W.D. Va. 2006); see also United States v. Howard, 
350 F.3d 125, 128 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“In applying the statute of limitations to mail and wire fraud the 
circuits appear uniformly to focus on the . . . mailing and use of the wires. No court has in any way 
suggested that the statute of limitations would be satisfied [if] . . . part of the scheme fell within the 
period.”). 
223 The Tenth Circuit in United States v. Reitmeyer appears to be the only court that has addressed whether 
a violation of the Major Fraud Act is a continuing offense for statute of limitations purposes. 356 F.3d 
1313, 1322 (10th Cir. 2004). The Reitmeyer court held that the Major Fraud Act by its explicit statutory 
language punishes each individual execution of a fraudulent scheme, rather than the scheme itself. Id. at 
1323. “[T]he discrete nature of a Major Fraud Act violation makes it unlikely Congress intended it to be a 
continuing offense for statute of limitations purposes.” Id.; see also supra note 214 (providing the text of 
the Major Fraud Act). 
224 United States v. Williams, 356 Fed. App’x. 167, 171 (10th Cir. 2009). 
225 Id. at 168. 
226 Id. at 170. 
227 Id. at 171. 
228 Id. 
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scheme: “Whoever . . . transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire . . . any 
writings . . . for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined.”229 
Moreover, the court failed to acknowledge the overwhelming weight of authority 
examining the same statutory provision and reaching the opposite conclusion: that wire 
fraud was a discrete offense. The Williams court’s procedure for addressing the issue is 
also suspect, given that the court neither acknowledged Toussie nor followed its test to 
determine whether the offense is continuing. In holding that wire fraud was a continuing 
offense, the Tenth Circuit created a rift with the numerous other circuits that have 
consistently held that wire fraud is not a continuing offense for statute of limitations 
purposes.230  
ii. Bank Fraud Is Not a Continuing Offense 
The fraudulent scheme approach has made a stronger impact in the area of bank 
fraud. Modeled after the mail and wire fraud statutes,231 the bank fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1344, criminalizes frauds perpetrated against FDIC-insured financial institutions.232 Its 
purpose is to protect the interests of those institutions and the federal government as their 
insurer.233 The statute punishes anyone who “knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, 
a scheme or artifice . . . to defraud a federally chartered or insured financial 
institution.”234 Courts generally agree that to “execute” under the statute is to place a 
bank at risk of financial loss.235  
The Eleventh Circuit, in United States v. De La Mata,236 conducted a formal 
Toussie analysis and determined that bank fraud is not a continuing offense. The 
defendants in De La Mata entered into fraudulent lease agreements and collected lease 
payments going forward until the defendants were indicted.237 The government argued 
that the defendants’ bank fraud continued until their scheme ended. The court, however, 
did not endorse the government’s argument and highlighted the absurdity of the 
fraudulent scheme approach: “[t]aken to its logical conclusion, the collection of rents on a 
lease obtained by fraud, for a term of 99 years, would toll the statute of limitations for 99 
years. We think this goes too far.”238 The court viewed the defendants’ collection of lease 
payments as conduct in furtherance of their scheme to defraud, conduct not covered 
under the bank fraud statute.239 The court’s holding is logically sound: when the 
                                                
229 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2006) (emphasis added). 
230 United States v. Barger, 178 F.3d 844 (7th Cir. 1999) (listing cases finding that wire fraud is not a 
continuing offense). 
231 Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1999). 
232 United States v. Bennett, 621 F.3d 1131, 1135 (9th Cir. 2010).  
233 See United States v. Davis, 989 F.2d 244, 247 (“[T]he purpose of [the bank fraud statute] is not to 
protect people who write checks to con artists but to protect the federal government’s interest as an insurer 
of financial institutions.”); Bennett, 621 F.3d at 1135 (“The [bank fraud] statute is ‘designed to provide an 
effective vehicle for the prosecution of fraud in which the victims are financial institutions.’”) (quoting S. 
Rep. No. 98-225 at 377 (1983)). 
234 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006). 
235 United States v. Anderson, 188 F.3d 886, 888 (7th Cir. 1999).  
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defendants executed the fraudulent loans, it caused them to collect lease payments; but 
the statute punishes the execution, not its effects. Effects that continue over time, such as 
the lease payments in De La Mata, do not turn the underlying bank fraud violation into a 
continuing offense. 
In contrast, in United States v. Longfellow, the Seventh Circuit introduced the 
fraudulent scheme approach into the bank fraud case law.240 The defendant, bank 
executive Robert Longfellow, was indicted for making six fraudulent loans to his 
customers. He argued that the statute of limitations barred his prosecution because the 
transactions fell outside the applicable limitations period.241 Focusing on the fact that 
Longfellow refinanced two of the loans during times that fell within the limitations 
period, the court held that the refinancing constituted “executions” of Longfellow’s 
scheme to defraud his employer bank. It concluded, “[t]he fact that only one or two 
executions fell within the statute of limitations does not detract from the entire pattern of 
loans’ [sic] being a scheme, and renders Longfellow no less culpable for the entire 
scheme.”242 In keeping with the fraudulent scheme approach, the Longfellow holding 
stands for the principle that the statute of limitations will not bar executions of bank fraud 
that occur outside of the applicable limitations period so long as at least one execution 
within the entire fraudulent scheme falls within that limitations period. The holding also 
treats the fraudulent scheme, not the execution, as the unit of offense for statute of 
limitations purposes. Under Longfellow, bank fraud is a continuing offense for which the 
statute of limitations does not commence until the fraudulent scheme ends.  
In United States v. Najjor,243 the Ninth Circuit subsequently expanded the 
principles elucidated in Longfellow. Defendant Frank Najjor had challenged his bank 
fraud conviction and asserted that the statute of limitations barred the conviction because 
all of the conduct constituting the alleged bank fraud transpired before the applicable ten-
year statute of limitations had commenced.244 The court disagreed, and, after minimal 
analysis, held that bank fraud, under 18 U.S.C. § 1344, was a continuing offense 
apparently because the statute, by its terms, implicates schemes.245 The court then 
focused on Najjor’s signing of a loan note that occurred within the ten-year window and 
found that the loan note signing was in furtherance of Najjor’s scheme to defraud. It 
explained, “[t]he [bank fraud] charge was brought within ten years of the date that Najjor 
signed the note. Thus, the . . . indictment was returned within the limitations period and 
the government could prosecute Najjor for the entire scheme to defraud.”246 Najjor 
maintains that the statute of limitations will not prohibit any conduct in furtherance of a 
bank fraud scheme that occurs outside of the applicable limitations period so long as at 
least one act in furtherance of the entire fraudulent scheme falls within that limitations 
period. The holding significantly augments the principles illustrated in Longfellow 
because it relaxes the standard needed to trigger the extension of the statute of 
limitations—from executions of a fraudulent scheme to any act in furtherance of such 
                                                
240 United States v. Longfellow, 43 F.3d 318, 325 (7th Cir. 1994). 
241 Id. at 319, 322. 
242 Id. at 325. 
243 United States v. Najjor, 255 F.3d 979, 983 (9th Cir. 2001). 
244 Id.  
245 Id. at 983. 
246 Id. at 983–84. 
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scheme—so that prosecutors may reap the benefits of the continuing offense doctrine. It 
is far easier for a prosecutor to argue that a particular action is in furtherance of a scheme 
to defraud, as opposed to demonstrating that the action is an execution that put a bank at a 
risk of loss.247  
The Longfellow and Najjor decisions were incorrectly decided due to the courts’ 
use of the fraudulent scheme approach. The cases, and the fraudulent scheme approach 
more generally, assume that the presence of the term “scheme” in 18 U.S.C. § 1344 
creates a continuing offense for statute of limitations purposes. The language of the 
statute plainly contradicts this assumption. Akin to mail and wire fraud, bank fraud 
prohibits executions or attempted executions of a scheme, not the scheme itself, nor 
conduct in furtherance of the scheme. The crime is complete and the statute of limitations 
begins to run upon an execution or attempted execution, and each execution constitutes a 
separate offense under the statute.248 Furthermore, an execution does not necessarily 
continue over time. Entering into a fraudulent bank transaction, like fraudulently 
depositing material in the mail or wiring funds across state lines, frequently occurs 
instantaneously and is discrete by nature. In short, bank fraud, under 18 U.S.C. § 1344 is 
not a continuing offense, as neither the statutory language nor the nature of the crime 
satisfies the first or second prongs of the Toussie test, respectively. Congress proclaimed 
its intent that bank fraud is complete at the time of the execution, so the statute of 
limitations begins at the time of the execution for this discrete offense. 
iii. Health Care Fraud Is Not a Continuing Offense 
The fraudulent scheme approach is shaping the courts’ treatment of health care 
fraud at the district court level. Modeled after the bank fraud statute and mirroring its 
structure,249 the health care fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1347, punishes one who “executes 
or attempts to execute” a scheme to defraud a health care program.250 Decisions 
addressing the relationship between health care fraud and the statute of limitations 
endorse the fraudulent scheme approach and hold that health care fraud is a continuing 
offense.251 These cases follow the same flawed logic found in the bank fraud decisions of 
Longfellow and Najjor. They conclude that the presence of a scheme to defraud that 
continues into the applicable statute of limitations period causes the offense to be timely 
under the statute of limitations.252 These decisions are misguided because they ignore the 
nature of the health care fraud statute as drafted by Congress—namely that the crime is 
complete, and that the statute of limitations commences at the moment one executes the 
scheme to defraud.253 For instance, falsely representing that one is eligible for services at 
                                                
247 United States v. De La Mata, 266 F.3d 1275, 1288 (11th Cir. 2001) (comparing an execution of a 
scheme with conduct in furtherance of a scheme). 
248 United States v. Anghaie, No. 09-CR-37, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23863, at *4 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 21, 2011). 
249 See 18 U.S.C. § 1343, supra note 211 and accompanying text. 
250 18 U.S.C. § 1347 (2006); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1344; supra note 212 (providing the pertinent language 
of 18 U.S.C. § 1347). 
251 See United States v. Refert, No. 05-30090, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 548, at *6 (D.S.D. Jan. 3, 2007); 
United States v. Mermelstein, 487 F. Supp. 2d 242, 255 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); United States v. Schickle, No. 
10-CR-34, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65937, at *3 (D. Me. July 1, 2010). 
252 Id. 
253 See United States v. Cooper, 283 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1231 (D. Kan. 2003) (holding that the unit of the 
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a health care facility, or issuing a fraudulent reimbursement claim for health care 
services, take place at a specific moment and do not continue over time or present an 
ongoing harm, the two staples of a continuing offense.254 
2. Eliminate the Fraudulent Scheme Approach 
For statute of limitations purposes, federal fraud crimes should not be classified as 
continuing offenses, as reflected by their statutory language and underlying nature. 
Congress expressed its intent that the applicable fraud crimes are complete at the time of 
the execution or attempted execution by expressly prohibiting only the execution itself. 
With a fixation on the presence of the term “scheme” in the fraud statutes, the fraudulent 
scheme approach, at its core, misinterprets the statutes and should be recognized for what 
it is—a technique for the government to sidestep the statute of limitations unfairly. Courts 
should decline to follow the fraudulent scheme approach when proffered by the 
government and instead implement the Toussie test, as many courts have already done, to 
conclude that fraud crimes are not continuing offenses. 
IV. A THREE-PART SOLUTION TO REFORM THE CONTINUING OFFENSE DOCTRINE 
The foregoing examination reveals widespread inconsistencies and resulting 
confusion surrounding the application of the continuing offense doctrine, with courts 
applying the same test to the same crime and producing conflicting results on whether the 
crime is continuing. As explored in Part III, the increase in the number of crimes deemed 
continuing is a troubling trend255 that flouts the long-established practice of courts rarely 
finding exceptions to the statute of limitations’ stated terms.256  
The trend can be viewed as part of a larger shift in the criminal law toward 
retributivism, a theory of criminal justice which espouses the belief that proportionate 
punishment is a justified response to criminal behavior.257 The expansion of the 
continuing offense doctrine falls in line with retributivists’ aims. In the eyes of the 
retributivist, those who commit crimes should be punished proportionately to the harm 
created, regardless of when those crimes are prosecuted.258 Hence, statutes of limitations 
can be seen as an impediment to justice according to this viewpoint. Correspondingly, the 
                                                                                                                                            
offense for health care fraud is either execution or attempted execution of the scheme to defraud). 
254 See supra subpart II.A (defining a continuing offense). 
255 Interestingly, this trend coincides with a legislative movement in Congress to create numerous 
exceptions to its general five-year limitations rule that extends the limitations periods applicable to a 
number of crimes. See Powell, supra note 30, at 124–25 (discussing Congress’s enactments to extend the 
limitations periods for numerous crimes). Scholars have noted that Congress has created roughly a dozen 
new exceptions over the last two decades, in contrast to the one or two exceptions traditionally created 
every few decades. Id.  
256 United States v. Del Percio, 657 F. Supp. 849, 852 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (“In most instances the 
limitations period starts to run when a crime is complete . . . Exceptions to this rule are rare.”). 
257 See White, supra note 11, at xi. The congressional movement towards extending limitations periods also 
aligns with retributivism. See Powell, supra note 30, at 136–37 (analyzing the relationship between 
extensions of statutes of limitations and the retributivism movement). 
258 See Powell, supra note 30, at 139 (discussing how, from a retributivist’s perspective, statutes of 
limitations are “only . . . obstructions in the way of securing a justly merited conviction.”). 
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continuing offense doctrine decreases the likelihood of a criminal offender escaping 
punishment by dispelling any statute of limitations challenge. 
The expansion nevertheless has riddled case law with exceptions to the normal 
operation of statutes of limitations and convoluted the proper application of justice 
expressed by Congress. This Article suggests a three-part solution to reforming the 
continuing offense doctrine and restoring order in this area of jurisprudence. The Article 
proposes: (1) amending the second prong of the Toussie test; (2) applying the rule of 
lenity to ambiguous offenses; and (3) revising federal legislation as needed. 
A. Amend the Toussie Test 
The Supreme Court should retain the Toussie test as the singular method for courts 
to determine whether Congress intended for an offense to be continuing. Resolving the 
underlying issue demands a bright-line rule, rather than flexible guidelines, to ensure that 
the analysis is made in a uniform, predictable way consistently across courts. The Toussie 
test meets this requirement because it is an organized assessment of congressional intent 
that, in principle, should deliver accurate results. The test correctly focuses on the intent 
of Congress, given that the legislature creates and controls the terms of both statutes of 
limitations and criminal offense statutes.259 Nevertheless, certain features of the test could 
be amended to provide more concrete guidance to the judiciary and boost the test’s 
reliability. 
The first prong of the Toussie test needs no revision. Its singular focus on the 
explicit language of the criminal statute is a logically sound starting point for the 
continuing offense analysis. Courts have had virtually no trouble analyzing statutory text 
to fulfill the prong’s requirements, nor have courts reached opposing outcomes when 
examining a given criminal statute under this prong.  
The Toussie test’s second prong, on the other hand, needs reform. The problematic 
applications detailed in Part III essentially arise from a lack of clarity and specificity 
within the prong.260 The vague notion of the “nature of the crime” should be revised to 
reflect a more concrete standard.261 To determine the “nature of the crime,” the Supreme 
Court should direct the judiciary to analyze each of the legal elements of the criminal 
offense at issue262 to see whether the elements cause harm continuously as each day 
passes.263 If one or more elements do not continuously cause harm, then the offense in 
question, per its nature, should not be deemed continuing.  
Applying the revised second prong shows that the elements of conspiracy, escape, 
                                                
259 See United States v. Villa, 470 F. Supp. 315, 320 n.4 (N.D.N.Y. 1979) (“[S]ince limitations questions 
are fundamentally legislative matters, they may not be lengthened or shortened by judicial fiat.”). 
260 Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 115 (1970). 
261 See supra subpart III.B (discussing the vagueness inherent in the second Toussie test prong).  
262 In order to discern congressional intent inherent in a criminal statute, a court should examine the 
statutorily defined legal elements of the particular offense in isolation from the particular facts within the 
court’s instant case. 
263 Such a revision would mirror contemporary understandings of the continuing offense doctrine. United 
States v. Morales, 11 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Yashar, 166 F.3d 873 (7th 
Cir. 1999); United States v. Fleetwood, 489 F. Supp. 129, 131 (D. Or. 1980) (“The government contends 
. . . that the crime charged is a continuing offense. If so, the statute of limitations would begin to run from 
. . . the last day all elements of the offense were present.”).  
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and crimes of possession cause harm to society continuously as a matter of course each 
day they exist, and thus the offenses satisfy this revised prong and merit their continuing 
offense status. The elements of other crimes such as embezzlement do not inherently 
continue over time, and thus these offenses should not be deemed continuing.264 While 
some of the elements of fraud, such as the presence of a scheme to defraud, could in 
theory cause harm each day in existence, other elements, such as the execution or 
attempted execution, do not so continue due to the execution’s discrete nature.265 Hence 
fraud crimes should not be deemed continuing offenses under this revised prong. 
B. Apply the Rule of Lenity 
When applying the Toussie test, courts should implement the rule of lenity if they 
find that a criminal offense is ambiguous regarding whether its nature is discrete or 
continuing. This time-honored principle of statutory construction dictates that criminal 
statutes be strictly construed and any ambiguities resolved in favor of the defendant.266 If 
a court determines that a criminal statute is ambiguous as to whether its offense is 
continuing, the court should conclude that such offense is not continuing under the rule of 
lenity. 
The rule of lenity harmonizes with the common law rules that dictate that (1) the 
continuing offense doctrine should be interpreted narrowly267 and (2) the statute of 
limitations should be construed in favor of the defendant in criminal cases “[w]hen doubt 
exists about the statute of limitations.”268 The underlying policies behind the statutes of 
limitations, including the protection of defendants and promotion of law enforcement 
efficiency, buttress the common law rules and support the use of the rule of lenity in the 
continuing offense context.269 Moreover, applying the rule of lenity coincides with the 
explicit congressional directive in 18 U.S.C. § 3282 that statutes of limitations should not 
be extended “except as otherwise expressly provided by law.”  
Utilizing the rule of lenity in continuing offense decisions could bring beneficial 
results. The rule of lenity could directly assist the judiciary by providing a guiding hand 
when it is unclear whether the nature of the offense is discrete or continuing. It could also 
protect against the arbitrary application of the continuing offense doctrine and help 
provide clarity, uniformity, and predictability in the criminal law, matters of central 
societal importance,270 by reducing the number of courts that adopt conflicting positions 
on whether an offense is continuing.  
                                                
264 See supra subpart III.C  (discussing the elements of embezzlement). 
265 See supra subpart III.D (discussing fraud crimes). As explained in subpart III.D, some of the elements of 
fraud (i.e., the presence of a scheme to defraud) continue over time, but other elements (e.g., the execution 
or attempted execution) do not. 
266 United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 411 (1973); see also Phillip M. Spector, The Sentencing Rule of 
Lenity, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 511, 511–12 (2002). 
267 See supra subpart I.D (discussing the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the continuing offense doctrine). 
268 United States v. Gilbert, 136 F.3d 1451, 1454 (11th Cir. 1998). 
269 See supra subpart I.B (exploring the policies underlying criminal statutes of limitations). 
270 See United States v. McGoff, 831 F.3d 1071, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“In the criminal context, courts 
have traditionally required greater clarity in draftsmanship. . . commensurate with the bedrock principle 
that in a free country citizens who are potentially subject to criminal sanctions should have clear notice of 
the behavior that may cause sanctions to be visited upon them.”). 
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C. Revise Criminal Statutes as Needed 
This Article recognizes that statutes of limitations can provoke the ire of the public, 
particularly those who embrace retributivist principles, given that the statutes may allow 
those who commit crimes to escape justice.271 Indeed, those adopting a retributivist 
perspective to criminal justice fault the mechanical operation of statutes of limitations for 
providing amnesty to defendants from prosecution.272 The Supreme Court of Florida has 
provided an apt response to such criticisms: 
There are those advocates of “law and order” among us who will 
view this decision as another example of courts being “soft on criminals.” 
We would respond by reminding these persons that the petitioners could 
have been prosecuted had their alleged crimes been detected, and had 
proceedings been commenced at any time within [the limitations period]. 
More significantly, it must be remembered that without law there can be 
no order. The law must be applied evenhandedly to all lest we run the risk 
of selective prosecutions.273  
Limitations statutes are intended to balance the government’s interest in 
administering justice with society’s interest in protecting those individuals who may have 
lost their ability to defend themselves due to the passage of time.274 If a particular statute 
of limitations upsets the balance by creating significant difficulty for the government in 
investigating and prosecuting a particular offense in a timely manner, then it is the 
responsibility of the legislature to correct the imbalance and revise the statute. The 
legislature, not the judiciary, has the authority to create and modify the terms of criminal 
offenses and the duration of the limitations periods, if any, that apply to those offenses.  
The continuing offense doctrine fundamentally upsets this separation of powers by 
permitting courts to extend limitations periods. By its operation, the doctrine weakens the 
set of protections inherent in statutes of limitations each time a court deems an offense to 
be continuing. The Supreme Court has cautioned against applying the doctrine due to 
these dangers,275 but, as explored in Part III of this Article, many courts nonetheless have 
been applying the doctrine with increasing frequency. This practice is a poor and 
improper substitute for legislative reform. If consensus emerges that certain crimes 
should be treated as continuing offenses for statute of limitations purposes, then Congress 
should take note and amend the pertinent criminal statutes to indicate that the crimes 
should be treated as continuing offenses.  
                                                
271 Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 123 (1970) (“[E]very statute of limitations . . . may permit a 
rogue to escape.”); see supra subpart I.C (discussing criticisms surrounding statutes of limitations). 
272 See United States v. Del Percio, 657 F. Supp. 849, 852 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (discussing the retributivist 
movement); see also Powell, supra note 30, at 135–36 (same). 
273 Reino v. State, 352 So.2d 853, 861 (Fla. 1977). 
274 See United States v. Otto, 742 F.2d 104, 107 (3d Cir. 1984) (“[T]he applicable statute of limitations . . . 
balances the government interest in prosecution with the need to protect those who may lose their means of 
defense.”) (citation omitted). 
275 See Toussie, 397 U.S. at 115 (“[T]he doctrine of continuing offenses should be applied in only limited 
circumstances . . .”). 
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CONCLUSION 
Criminal statutes of limitations serve important public interests, including 
protecting the accused against stale criminal charges, motivating law officials to gather 
fresh evidence and issue timely notice of any accusations, and providing relief to the 
judiciary from adjudicating long-abandoned crimes. Enacted by the legislature, the 
statutes are to be liberally interpreted to favor the defendant.  
By creating the continuing offense doctrine, the Supreme Court has developed an 
exception to the standard operation of the statute of limitations that stalls the 
commencement of the limitations period for offenses deemed continuing, almost always 
to the detriment of the defendant. Since the advent of the Toussie test, the judiciary has 
struggled with the process of determining whether offenses are discrete or continuing for 
statute of limitations purposes.  
A troubling pattern has emerged from this confusion where courts have applied the 
continuing offense doctrine haphazardly, straying from the Supreme Court’s dictate that 
the continuing offense doctrine be applied narrowly due to its drastic effects upon the 
statute of limitations’ operation. If continued, the pattern will eradicate the protections 
afforded by the statute of limitations for any offense where a set of alleged violations 
have transpired over a period of time.  
To combat the excessive use of the continuing offense doctrine, the doctrine should 
be reformed by amending the Supreme Court’s Toussie test, employing the rule of lenity 
in continuing offense cases, and revising criminal offense statutes and statutes of 
limitations as needed. This combination of measures may well steer the continuing 
offense doctrine back to its originally intended purpose and thwart the practice of 
deeming an inherently discrete offense to be continuing, a practice that sidesteps the 
proper operation of the statute of limitations. 
